CULTURAL MEANING AND DEFINING A POLICYMAKING SITUATION: MAKING SENSE OF THE POLICY RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS by Eads, Alicia Danielle
CULTURAL MEANING  
AND  
DEFINING A POLICYMAKING SITUATION:  
MAKING SENSE OF THE POLICY RESPONSE  
TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Cornell University 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
Alicia Danielle Eads 
 
August 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2017 Alicia Danielle Eads 
  
CULTURAL MEANING AND DEFINING A POLICYMAKING SITUATION: 
MAKING SENSE OF THE POLICY RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
Alicia Danielle Eads, Ph.D. 
 
Cornell University August 2017 
 
 
Faced with a collapsing housing market, which was disrupting financial markets via 
“toxic” mortgage-backed securities, U.S. policymakers acted aggressively to stabilize financial 
markets but remained circumspect about intervening in the housing market. Academics and 
policymakers alike acknowledge that the federal policy response to the housing market collapse 
was a “gross inadequacy.” This dissertation examines why that was so, identifying variations in 
key policymakers understandings and expectations of mortgage borrowers and mortgage lenders. 
The cultural tension was not over the causes of the crisis, as might be expected. Policymakers 
quickly sorted out the basic narrative of the subprime expansion, loose underwriting, and 
ubiquitous mortgage-backed securities. Instead, the relevant cultural meanings that implied 
vastly different policy responses were more fundamental: a construction of mortgage borrowers 
and lenders. Are mortgage borrowers rational investors who will walk away from an underwater 
mortgage? Or are they struggling homeowners, taken advantage of by predatory lenders? In one 
of these constructions it makes sense to commit tax dollars to the problem while in the other it 
would be irresponsible.  
The dissertation also analyzes the construction of the foreclosure crisis within U.S. states, 
a context that allows for statistical analysis of the relationship between cultural meaning and 
policy adoption. Some states’ media outlets discussed the foreclosure crisis as a market 
phenomenon while others discussed it as the result of predatory lending practices. Applying 
Latent Dirichlet Allocation topic modeling to text from 2,600 newspaper articles, I measure the 
multiple cultural meanings that the crisis assumed in different states. Results from event history 
analyses show that particular cultural meanings predict the adoption of aggressive foreclosure 
prevention policies, adjusting for other factors such as the extent of the housing market collapse 
and political party control of state legislatures.  
Finally, this dissertation also considers the relationships among wealth, debt, and family 
stability. The policies implemented in response to the recent crisis influenced which types of 
assets recovered value following the Great Recession, thus affecting household wealth and the 
longstanding trend of rising wealth inequality. The crisis policies also allowed a "debt overhang" 
to remain among millions of households. The family is a key micro-level institution that 
experiences and transmits the inequality effects of macro-economic policies. Analyses in this 
part of the dissertation use data from the 1996 to 2008 panels of the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation to offer a comprehensive account of how wealth and debt relates to family 
stability. The findings include that, as anticipated, higher holdings of liquid and illiquid assets 
are associated with a decrease in the likelihood of dissolution. During the Great Recession, 
median wealth in the U.S. dropped by 44 percent, exposing more families to the risk of 
dissolution. Indeed, this analysis shows that couples were at 54 percent greater risk of dissolving 
their unions during the recession years. The analysis also shows, perhaps contrary to intuition, 
secured debt, such as mortgage debt, is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of 
dissolution. 
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 1 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
I see realistically only one way in which we could avoid a drag [on 
the economy] from the financial system, which would be if, in fact, 
we get lucky and the housing market begins to stabilize and there’s 
a sense that we’ve reached bottom there and house prices are 
stabilizing. 
 
Federal Reserve Chairman, Benjamin Bernanke, December 20071 
 
 
 
 Faced with a collapsing housing market, which was disrupting financial markets via 
“toxic” mortgage-backed securities, U.S. policymakers acted aggressively and innovatively 
(Cecchetti 2009) to stabilize financial markets but remained circumspect when it came to 
intervening in the housing market. The financial market stabilization efforts during the crisis 
were necessary to prevent a collapse of the global financial system (Blinder 2013).  However, 
these efforts alone provided little safety net for more vulnerable market participants. 
Consequently, the crisis policies shaped the lopsided economic recovery—the financial system 
was rescued, but millions of middle and low-income homeowners lost their home and net worth 
and millions more remain “underwater” on their mortgages (Blinder 2015: 139; Mian and Sufi 
2015).    
 An extensive examination of the crisis events and policies using a wide range of primary 
and secondary sources reveals several important elements of the crisis. First, policymakers faced 
an uncertain situation—most officials were unsure of what to make of changing indicators from 
the housing market, including rising mortgage defaults. Second, after a period ambivalence from 
government organizations, they settled into general policy positions with regard to the housing 
                                                
1 Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting transcript December 11, 2007. 
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markets, which they maintained throughout the crisis – the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) advocated for aggressive government intervention in modifying mortgages 
while three other organizations at the center of the federal government’s crisis policy response 
(the Federal Reserve, the Treasury Department, and the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development) did not. Finally, it is not obvious why the federal government refrained from 
aggressive policy actions to stabilize the housing markets. As the quote above from Federal 
Reserve Chairman Bernanke indicates, policymakers saw the related financial and housing 
market problems as a serious threat to the economy. Further, that a stabilized housing market 
could avert that threat. However, the arguably most powerful economic policymaker in the U.S. 
was simply hoping that they would get “lucky” and the housing market would stabilize. Indeed, 
academics and policymakers alike acknowledge that the policy response to the housing market 
collapse was a “gross inadequacy” and “half-hearted” (Blinder 2013: 343; Blinder 2015: 148; 
Geithner 2014; Immergluck 2013). This dissertation contributes substantively to the vast 
literature on the financial crisis by examining why this was so.  
 In chapter 2 of this dissertation, I examine the crisis policymaking at the federal level. I 
find that policymakers’ definition of the housing market problem are necessary to understand 
why the FDIC, a banking regulator, advocated for government intervention in mortgage 
modification while other policymakers—including the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD), whose raisons d'etre is to support homeownership—opposed such 
government intervention. Previous work on policymaking and organizational theory more 
broadly tends to leave the construction of the policymaking problem unexamined.  
 I incorporate two separate theoretical strands into a coherent framework that sheds light 
on this complex and consequential policymaking episode. First, I employ a pragmatist 
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perspective, which recognizes the importance of the definition of the situation for understanding 
actions pursued in response. Pragmatists theorized that, faced with an unfamiliar situation, actors 
could experimentally and creatively develop new responses and that these responses would 
proceed from the definition of the new situation. For some early pragmatists, defining the 
situation was simply part of the experimental and creative process and they recognized few if 
any limits on actors’ creativity. Although pragmatists emphasize the importance of the definition 
of the situation they nevertheless left the problem situation “undertheorized and vague” 
(Whitford 2002: 341).  
To bring some precision to the theoretical framework of the problem situation, I identify 
defining a policymaking situation as a cultural process (Lamont, Beljean, and Clair 2014). 
Cultural processes are those based on “inter-subjective meaning-making: they take shape through 
the mobilization of shared categories and classification systems through which individuals 
perceive and make sense of their environment” (Lamont, Beljean, and Clair 2014: 574). Viewing 
defining the situation as a cultural process suggests that policymakers’ definitions will be 
constructed from the meanings and categories available to them to make sense of the 
policymaking situation they face. What I find is that most policymakers defined the problem in 
the housing market such that government intervention did not make sense. Government-led 
mortgage modifications made sense according to only the FDIC’s definition of the situation, 
which varied in critical ways from other policymakers’ definitions. This analysis contributes to 
recent culture and policy work by locating available cultural meanings with which to define the 
situation within policymaking organizations’ previous and ongoing engagements in the policy 
arena. Recent culture and policy scholars highlight the importance of cultural meanings for 
explaining the content of policies and pinpoint a weakness in previous work that relies on the 
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vague notion of culture as “national values” (Skocpol 1992; Steensland 2006; Steinmetz 1999; 
Sewell 1985). Nevertheless, recent work fails to improve upon this much by invoking “deeply 
embedded cultural categories” (Steensland 2006: 1274) without saying where they are 
embedded. This analysis also contributes to organizational theory by showing the importance of 
the definition of the situation that organizations are acting on for understanding their behavior.  
 In chapter 3 of this dissertation, I quantitatively test the effect of the definition of the 
situation on passing particular policies. Specifically, I use the context of foreclosure prevention 
legislation that was passed by some U.S. states during the foreclosure crisis. Some states’ media 
outlets discussed the foreclosure crisis as a market phenomenon while others discussed it as the 
result of predatory lending practices. Applying Latent Dirichlet Allocation topic modeling to text 
data from 2,600 newspaper articles that I collected, I measure the multiple cultural meanings that 
the crisis assumed in different states. Combining these computational text analysis techniques 
with standard event history analysis methods, this chapter offers statistical evidence that “culture 
matters.” Specifically, results show that particular cultural meanings used to discuss the 
foreclosure crisis predict the adoption of aggressive foreclosure prevention policies, adjusting for 
other factors such as the extent of the housing market collapse and political party control of state 
legislatures. I also test whether use of similar cultural meanings to discuss the crisis creates a 
cultural pathway for policy diffusion between different states (Strang and Meyer 1993; Strang 
and Bradburn 2001). This analysis joins the emerging body of work that uses computational 
tools to “measure culture” (Bail 2014) and is one of the first papers to use computational 
methods to quantify cultural meaning for modeling cultural sources of diffusion (see also Gilardi, 
Shipan, and Wuest 2017). 
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Chapter 4 of the dissertation examines micro-level consequences of the macro-level 
policies that are developed through the processes outlined in the earlier parts of the dissertation. 
Specifically, this chapter considers the relationships among wealth, debt, and family stability. 
The policies implemented in response to the recent crisis influenced which types of assets 
recovered value following the Great Recession, thus affecting household wealth and the long-
standing trend of rising wealth inequality (Piketty 2014; Pfeffer, Danziger, and Schoeni 2013). 
The crisis policies also allowed a “debt overhang” to remain among millions of U.S. households 
(Mian and Sufi 2014). Wolff (2016) shows that the higher debt ratio among middle-class 
families going into the recession compared to wealthier households is a major factor in the 
increased levels of wealth inequality that resulted from the loss of wealth during the recession. 
The family is a key micro-level institution that experiences and transmits the inequality effects of 
macro-economic policies and socioeconomic inequalities in family life have grown markedly.  
The analysis in this chapter uses data from the 1996 to 2008 panels of the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation to offer a comprehensive account of how wealth and debt 
relates to family stability and how that relationship varies by union type, age cohort, and both 
type and amount of assets and debt. The findings include that, as anticipated, higher holdings of 
liquid and illiquid assets are associated with a decrease in the likelihood of dissolution. During 
the Great Recession, median wealth in the U.S. dropped by 44 percent (Wolff 2016), exposing 
more and more families to the risk of dissolution. Indeed, chapter 4 chows that couples were at 
54 percent greater risk of dissolving their unions during the recession years.  
Perhaps contrary to intuition, secured debt, such as mortgage debt, is associated with a 
decrease in the likelihood of dissolution. For all of the concern regarding the growing debt held 
among U.S. households, there is this one potentially positive association. However, before 
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encouraging the taking on of secured debts, more needs to be understood about the direction of 
causality as well as the causal mechanisms underlying this relationship.  
 Finally, this chapter also makes clear that it is important to distinguish between secured 
and unsecured debt. Because while lower levels of unsecured debt does not appear to affect 
relationship stability, large unsecured debts are associated with an increase risk of dissolution.  
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CHAPTER 2: SAVING BANKS BUT NOT HOMEOWNERS: 
A PRAGMATIST FRAMEWORK OF CRISIS POLICYMAKING 
 
 
 
Why did policymakers not intervene to stabilize the housing market during the recent housing 
and financial market crisis in the U.S.? The housing market collapse was the epicenter of the 
broader financial market crisis and the turmoil in the housing market continued after the panic in 
financial markets subsided, at least in the U.S. Yet policymakers avoided acting directly to 
stabilize the housing market. Academics and policymakers alike acknowledge that the policy 
response to the housing market collapse was a “gross inadequacy” and “half-hearted” (Bair 
2012; Blinder 2013: 343; Blinder 2015: 148; Geithner 2014; Immergluck 2013). This article 
examines why that was so. What I find is that policymakers defined the problem in the housing 
market such that government intervention did not make sense. This empirical puzzle—why 
policymakers avoided intervening in the housing market, even as they intervened in the financial 
markets—allows for an examination of a theoretical question: how do policymakers come to 
understand the problems they are responding to?  
 Previous work on policymaking tends to leave the construction of the problem 
unexamined (Schneider and Sidney 2009) and instead emphasizes the role of organizational 
institutions and capacity (Skocpol 1985). From this perspective, policymakers will implement 
policies to the extent that their fiscal resources and organizational capabilities allow. However, 
this perspective cannot account for the content of the policies that policymakers pursue (Huber, 
Ragin, Stephens 1993; Korpi 1989; Steensland 2006). Organizational theory more broadly 
suggests that organizational institutions and routines are not simply resources but function as 
constraints or guides for policymaking action (Campbell 1998; DiMaggio and Powell 1991; 
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Scott 2014). However, how do we know which institutions and routines in complex government 
organizations will guide action in a particular policymaking episode? Further, another 
organizational theory argues that economic crises, or other such shocks, disrupt the usual 
reproductive nature of foregoing institutional and organizational structures (Clemens and Cook 
1999; Fligstein and McAdam 2012). Which begs the question of what guides policymaking 
organizations in crisis policymaking episodes?   
 In this article, I employ a pragmatist perspective, which recognizes the importance of the 
definition of the situation for understanding actions pursued in response. For pragmatists, social 
actors encounter the world as situations or problems to be acted upon or solved (Dewey 1929; 
Gross 2007; 2009; James ([1907] 1981; Joas 1993; McDonnell, Bail, Tavory 2017; Schneiderhan 
2011). Most of the time, actors face familiar situations that have accompanying responses or 
solutions. Sometimes, however, actors face a seemingly novel situation for which they have no 
ready response.2 Faced with an unfamiliar situation, actors can experimentally establish a new 
line of action. In such a situation, pragmatists stressed the importance of the definition of the 
situation for understanding action: “every single act…is dependent on the definition of the 
situation” (Park and Burgess [1921] 1924). They nevertheless left the problem situation 
“undertheorized and vague” (Whitford 2002: 341). A particular difficulty being that “everything 
and nothing could be a problem situation” and given the “heavy explanatory load” that the 
definition of the situation carries, this is unsatisfactory (Whitford 2002: 342).  
The aim of this article is to specify the problem situation faced by policymakers during 
the recent crisis and to elaborate a process by which policymakers defined that situation, which 
                                                
2 This notion of familiar versus unfamiliar situations is similar to Swidler’s (1986) conception of 
settled versus unsettled times.  
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in turn implied particular policy responses. The crux of the housing problem during the crisis is 
reflected in a question repeatedly posed to policymakers: what are you doing to help current 
homeowners in distress? Policymakers initially responded as if to a familiar problem, by re-
framing on-going programs and policies as solutions to the current situation. However, as these 
solutions increasingly seemed inappropriate or ineffective, policymakers had to make sense of 
the problem of distressed homeowners.  
A critical element in this process is cultural meaning, which recent work examining 
policymaking emphasizes is necessary for understanding the direction that policymaking takes 
(Norton 2014; Skrentny 2006; Steensland 2006). The current article contributes by locating 
relevant cultural meanings within policymaking organizations’ engagements in the policy 
arena—the housing market in the current case. I conceptualize the process of defining the 
policymaking situation as inter-subjective meaning-making that takes place within and among 
policymaking organizations (Lamont, Beljean, Clair 2014). Thus, the available meanings and 
categories with which to define a situation are those embedded at the organizational level. 
Examining cultural meaning at this level, rather than conceiving of culture at the national level 
(e.g. Dobbin 1994), helps account for the conflict that often characterizes policymaking. 
Relevant organizational meanings are those that “solve” the current situation by making sense of 
it and implying a course of action (Joas 1993; McDonnell, Bail, Tavory 2017).  
The case of policymaking during the recent crisis is a good case to examine the process 
of defining the situation and the effect on the policy response. Economic events and crises are 
not culturally objective phenomena (Blyth 2002; Hay 1996; 1999). They are uncertain, 
ambiguous situations that need to be processed into a meaningful problem that policymakers can 
respond to. However, it can be difficult to recognize definitions as anything other than objective 
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assessments because they become taken for granted (Berger and Luckmann, 1966), especially 
when technocrats are the ones constructing the definitions (Fourcade 2009). During this recent 
crisis, however, one policymaker (the FDIC) defined the situation differently, allowing for 
comparison.  
The research design in this article uses comparison for analytical leverage and combines 
more traditional comparative data and methods with emerging computational data collection and 
analysis techniques. I examine the policymaking of four government agencies: the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Federal Reserve (the Fed), the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and the Treasury Department, leveraging the 
similarities and differences in the meanings and categories embedded in their pre-crisis 
engagements with the housing market, their evolving definitions of the housing market problems, 
and the crisis policies they advocated. I make reference to one additional comparison—between 
the policymaking aimed at stabilizing the housing market and that aimed at stabilizing the 
financial market. This comparison casts doubt on some explanations for why policymakers were 
not more aggressive in stabilizing the housing market. For example, that policymakers did not 
know if more aggressive plans to stabilize the housing market would work and that there was no 
political will for more aggressive policies. The comparison with financial market crisis policies 
is useful here because policymakers did not know whether their efforts in the financial markets 
would work either (Bernanke 2015; Geithner 2014; Paulson 2010). Yet they proceeded anyway 
in the face of considerable uncertainty, political opposition, and public backlash. The key to 
understanding the conflict between the FDIC and the other agencies and to understanding the 
other agencies hesitancy in intervening in the housing market lies in their definitions of the 
situation.  
 12 
THE HOUSING AND FINANCIAL MARKET CRISIS 
Housing prices turned in mid-2006, starting a cascade of events.3 Including a drastic increase in 
mortgage payment delinquencies and foreclosures. Through the spring of 2007, most 
policymakers predicted that these problems would remain “contained” in the subprime mortgage 
sector and not “spillover” into the prime housing market (Eichengreen 2014: 169; Paulson 2010: 
66).4 Policymakers seemed to have little awareness at this time that these emerging problems in 
the subprime market might spill over into financial markets (Eichengreen 2014: 171; Fligstein, 
Brundage, and Schultz 2014). However, as defaults and foreclosures continued to rise and, 
consequently, financial market participants had difficulty valuing the securities that were based 
on the now-disrupted streams of mortgage payments, this created a crisis in confidence 
(Swedberg 2013) as market participants were not sure of the extent of their counterparties’ 
holdings of these now “toxic” assets (Fligstein & Goldstein 2010). Thus, the problems in the 
housing market spilled over into financial markets. Policymakers and market participants became 
abruptly aware of this on August 9, 2007 when a large French bank, BNP Paribus, temporarily 
blocked investors from withdrawing money from three of its funds that were heavily invested in 
the U.S. housing market (Eichengreen 2014: 176).  
 What should policymakers do about this related housing and financial market crisis? A 
December 2007 quote from Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke suggests that there were two 
scenarios in which the dual crisis might not catastrophically affect the broader economy: 
 
                                                
3 According to the Case-Shiller Index, housing prices peaked in June of 2006. 
4 Federal Reserve 3/28/07. All quoted speeches will be referenced in footnotes by the agency’s 
name and the date of the speech. A more complete reference for all quoted speeches can be 
found in Appendix A.  
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I see realistically only one way in which we could avoid a drag [on the overall 
economy] from the financial system, which would be if, in fact, we get lucky and 
the housing market begins to stabilize and there’s a sense that we’ve reached 
bottom there and house prices are stabilizing.5 
 
One way to avoid a “drag from the financial system” would be if the financial system itself 
stabilized. The other way, as Bernanke points out, is if the housing market stabilized. Since 
borrowers not paying on their mortgages constituted the housing market crisis and directly 
caused the financial market disruptions, policymakers could have addressed the crises from the 
bottom up, so to speak, by helping borrowers make their mortgage payments. There were various 
proposals about how, specifically, to do this. For example, “deficit hawk” economist Martin 
Feldstein suggested that the federal government make loans to homeowners for 20 percent of 
their current mortgage (Feldstein 2008). Economist and former Fed official, Alan Blinder 
proposed reviving a Great Depression-era program by which the government would buy and re-
write mortgages (Blinder 2008). As long as the government covered at least some of the losses to 
banks and investors who were holding the mortgage-backed securities, such policies would not 
erode banks’ balance sheets more than massive foreclosures and asset write-downs would. Such 
policies would actually work toward stabilizing financial markets, as they would have provided 
capital to shaky financial institutions. Scholars of the Great Depression show that bank 
stabilization was indeed one of the effects of that era’s foreclosure prevention efforts 
(Eichengreen 2014: 239). This consequence of government-funded foreclosure prevention was 
not lost on government officials during the recent crisis either; one top Treasury official noted, 
albeit negatively, that such policies were a “way to funnel money to institutions that had made 
bad lending decisions and to investors who had bought the loans” (Swagel 2009: 28). Opposition 
                                                
5 Federal Reserve 12/11/2007 
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to funneling money via mortgage borrowers is puzzling given the innovative and aggressive 
efforts implemented to provide capital to institutions and markets by any other means possible.6 
 It is consequential that policymakers did not take up Feldstein’s, Blinder’s, or others’ 
plans for federal intervention to stabilize the housing market. Eichengreen (2014: 189) argues 
“we can say that a bit of additional stimulus at the beginning of 2008 might have averted the 
need for a much larger stimulus in 2009.” Policymakers did not take up these plans later either, 
after the major stress in financial markets had calmed. Treasury even avoided spending money 
that was earmarked for foreclosure prevention as part of the mandate in the TARP legislation to 
“maximize assistance to homeowners” (Barofsky 2012; COP 2009, 2011; SIGTARP 2010). 
Mian and Sufi (2015) argue that the depth of the recession and the slow recovery are attributable 
to the “debt overhang” borrowers were left with (see also, Blinder 2015: 139).  
 By the end of 2007, policymakers agreed about the seriousness of the problems in the 
housing market for the broader economy and they understood the connections between the 
housing and the financial markets. The Fed shifted into crisis policymaking by putting into effect 
emergency lending programs to try to stabilize financial markets (Cecchetti 2009: 52). 
Policymakers knew that crisis policies needed to be “clear and easy-to-execute” and “encourage 
participation” from financial institutions (Paulson 2010: 306); they could not be “temporizing 
half-measures” and they could not be used to “mete out punishment” if they were going to work 
(Geithner 2014: 9). Policymakers were ultimately successful in these efforts; financial markets 
stabilized and began to recover in early 2009 (Blinder 2013; 2015).  
                                                
6 For information on the Fed’s emergency programs, see: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst.htm 
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 The picture looks very different from the perspective of the housing market. Unlike the 
easy-to-execute financial market policies that encouraged participation, the housing policies 
contained restrictions that severely limited the number of borrowers who were eligible. In this 
case, policymakers were concerned about meting out punishment, or at least not “rewarding” 
certain borrowers with help (Swagel 2009; Paulson 2010: 74). Even more consequential than 
restrictive eligibility rules, the housing policies were also voluntary in that lenders and servicers 
were encouraged but not required to do anything. The crisis housing policies were criticized 
almost as soon as they were rolled out and later assessments of them have been no more positive 
(Blinder 2013, 2015; Immergluck 2013; Kiel and Pierce 2010; NCLC 2009; Powell and Martin 
2011; Said and Zito 2007; SIGTARP 2011; Swarms 2008). The percent of mortgages in default 
continued increasing into 2010 and have yet to return to pre-crisis levels.    
  
 
THE POLICYMAKERS AND EXISTING EXPLANATIONS 
 
The federal agencies at the center of the crisis policymaking were the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), the Federal Reserve (the Fed), the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD), and the Treasury Department (Bernanke 2015; Blinder 2013, 2015; 
Paulson 2010; Bair 2012; Geithner 2014). Of these four agencies, only the FDIC sought 
aggressive government intervention in the housing market. Existing organizational and 
institutional perspectives are limited in their ability to make sense of this discrepancy in policy 
solutions between the agencies or why it was the FDIC instead of, for example, HUD that 
advocated for policies to address the housing market problems.  
 One existing perspective argues that organizational and institutional structures shape 
organizations’ actions (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). An explanation from this perspective might 
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be, for example, the Federal Reserve had legal authority and the organizational capability going 
into the crisis to lend to liquidity-constrained banks as part of its responsibility to maintain 
financial stability (see Table 1).  
      Table 1. Governmental positions and functions of each agency. 
Agency Main Functions Structural Position 
Federal 
Reserve 
 
1. Conduct monetary policy. 
2. Supervise and regulate banks. 
3. Maintain financial stability. 
 
Independent agency; self-
funded. 
FDIC 
 
1. Deposit insurer. 
2. Examine and supervise banks. 
3. Receiver for failing banks. 
 
Independent agency; self-
funded. 
Treasury 
 
1. Manage Federal finances. 
2. Collect taxes. 
3. Manage currency production. 
4. Supervise banks. 
5. Advise on financial, monetary, 
economic, trade, and tax policy. 
6. Enforce Federal finance and tax 
laws. 
 
Executive agency; 
Treasury Secretary is a 
cabinet member; Treasury 
is funded through 
congressional 
appropriations. 
HUD 
 
1. Administer programs to promote 
housing attainability. 
2. Administer programs for 
community development. 
3. Conduct research to guide policies 
on housing community 
development. 
4. Insure mortgage loans. 
 
Executive agency; HUD 
Secretary is a cabinet 
member; HUD is funded 
through congressional 
appropriations. 
 
 
Thus, we should expect the Fed to develop crisis solutions based on these capabilities. However, 
a comparative consideration of these four agencies’ main functions and structural positions 
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within the Federal government suggests that we might have expected the Fed and the FDIC, as 
banking regulators (one of their main functions) and as independent agencies (structural 
positions), to have advocated a similar approach to the crisis, but they did not. See Table 1. We 
also might have expected HUD, as the agency whose main function is to support affordable 
housing and homeownership, to have been the agency supporting government intervention in the 
housing market but, instead, that was the FDIC.   
 Further, while organizational and institutional structures may provide a foundation for the 
crisis policy response, they cannot make sense of deviations in policymaking from the obvious 
paths set by particular structures. For example, the Treasury Department used its Exchange 
Stability Fund (ESF), a $50 billion fund that is supposed to be used in currency trades to stabilize 
the U.S. dollar, to guarantee the normally uninsured mutual funds.7 Neither Treasury’s 
organizational structure nor main functions make sense of Treasury using the fund in this way.8 
In general, an issue with this perspective is that organizations, particularly large federal agencies, 
consist of many, sometimes contradictory structures and routines. How can we anticipate which 
will guide action in any given policymaking episode?  
 Further, organizational and institutional structures are supposed to guide action by 
limiting the range of possible actions that organizational actors can imagine while also enabling 
action by providing scripts or routines for particular courses of action (e.g. Fligstein, Brundage, 
and Schultz 2014). This misses the reality of interaction that occurred during the crisis 
                                                
7 See Treasury’s announcement of the guarantee: https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/hp1161.aspx 
8 Treasury used the ESF in 1994 to guarantee loans to Mexico during the Mexican Peso Crisis. 
Although this is historical precedent for using the fund in a crisis, this does not explain why 
Treasury should have used the fund in the recent crisis to backstop money market funds rather 
than to backstop mortgages or something else altogether. 
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policymaking. If constraints on action are imposed by the impossibility of imagining alternative 
lines of action, then early interaction between the agencies should have led to more convergence 
on policy solutions as they shared information and policy ideas with each other (DiMaggio 
1997). This is not what happened. In May 2007, the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve, 
and the FDIC met at an inter-agency meeting to discuss the housing market turmoil (Bair 2012; 
Swagel 2009). During the meeting the FDIC predicted a much steeper increase in the numbers of 
delinquencies and foreclosures than the other agencies and advocated for systematic, 
government-led foreclosure prevention efforts but gained no support in this from the other 
agencies (Bair 2012; Swagel 2009).   
 While it is possible that commitment to organization-specific routinized lines of actions 
might have prevented the agencies from seeing each other’s perspectives as useful initially 
(Campbell 1998: 385), in spite of this interaction, institutional scholars predict that habitual 
responses that fail to achieve results will be abandoned for more creative solutions in crisis 
situations (Strang and Macy 2001). Thus, as the crisis in the housing markets continued to 
worsen and the initial policy efforts failed to stem the still-rising defaults and foreclosures, the 
agencies’ initial reluctance to try to the FDIC’s solutions should have given way to a willingness 
to try other approaches. This lack of creativity and willingness in crisis housing solutions is 
puzzling since there was innovative policymaking during this crisis. The Fed, for example, acted 
creatively in putting itself at risk of losses on certain Bear Stearns’ mortgage-backed securities in 
order to assist in the sale of Bear to JP Morgan Chase and again in making emergency loans to 
American International Group (AIG). As noted earlier, Treasury put its Exchange Stability Fund 
to creative use in backstopping money market funds. Although these agencies acted innovatively 
during the crisis, all of the creativity was aimed at stabilizing financial markets. Only the FDIC 
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developed creative solutions to stabilize the housing market. For example, in order to spur 
mortgage modifications, the FDIC proposed a loss-sharing policy in which the Federal 
government would share the losses on a mortgage that had been modified according to certain 
guidelines, if the borrowers ultimately ended up in foreclosure anyway (Bair 2012).  
 Culture and policy scholars have been building the case that cultural meanings and 
categories are necessary to understand policies and their particularities (Steinmetz 1999; 
Campbell 1998). For example, Skrentny (2006) shows that cultural categories affect 
policymakers’ perceptions regarding which groups are considered “minorities” and, further, as 
“deserving” minorities, thus affecting the enactment of affirmative action intervention on behalf 
of some ethno-racial groups but not women or white ethnic groups. Similarly, Steendland (2006) 
observes that cultural categories of worth prevented guaranteed annual income welfare policies 
from passing in the U.S. because such policies would transgress cultural boundaries that 
separated the “worthy” poor from the poor who were “unworthy” of government assistance. 
Norton (2014) argues more broadly that the ability of states to carry out action, in general, is 
organized and coordinated around cultural meanings. Much like Weber’s notion that ideas work 
like “switchmen” to determine the “tracks” along which social action will proceed (Weber 
[1922] 1946: 280), cultural meaning shapes which are the appropriate arenas and content of 
policy interventions.  
 However, it remains unclear how particular meanings become relevant in particular 
policymaking episodes. Integrating the pragmatist perspective is one way to address this issue 
because it suggests that culture enters the policymaking process via the definition of the 
situation. In turn, contemporary cultural sociology’s more precise concept of culture as meaning 
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improves the pragmatist framework by refining the pragmatist’s catchall concept of culture (e.g. 
Blumer 1969: 6).  
 A remaining issue is identifying the locus of available cultural meanings. To use 
Steensland’s case as example again, if unemployment becomes “structural” unemployment 
during a particular policymaking episode, where did “structural” come from? Why was it 
available to the Kennedy administration to define the situation in this way? Recent culture and 
policy scholars pinpoint a weakness in previous work that relies on the vague notion of “national 
values,” which suggests that meaning is floating around, with about equal consistency, 
everywhere within national boarders (Steensland 2006; Steinmetz 1999; Sewell 1985). 
Nevertheless, recent work fails to improve upon this much by invoking “deeply embedded 
cultural categories” (Steensland 2006: 1274) without saying where they are embedded and others 
simply leave the “origins of…meanings” “beyond the scope” of current work (Skrentny 2006: 
1768). Norton (2014: 1560), in his work on the English empire’s ability to effectively exert 
power over pirates, posits “State agents in different positions in the structure of the empire 
advanced a series of solutions to the problem of classifying and punishing pirates.”  However, he 
leaves unexamined the source or reason for the different meanings advanced among different 
state agents.  
     
 
PRAGMATIST DEFINITION OF THE SITUATION AS CULTURAL PROCESS 
 
The situation in the housing market developed into an “indeterminate situation” that needed to be 
made sense of (Whitford 2002: 340). Early statements from policymakers reflected uncertainty 
and ambiguity: the FDIC noted, on the one hand, that “mortgage credit quality remains strong at 
present” but on the other hand that “certain developments … could … potentially amplify the 
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adverse effects of a housing slowdown.”9 The Fed observed, “the OFHEO [housing] price index 
is still increasing a bit” but also that “the financial condition of some households has become 
pretty fragile.”10 Later, in mid-2007, the FDIC reflected:  
I don't know of anyone … who really ‘connected the dots’ on this problem until 
late last year. Certainly, we all knew sub prime lending was a growing asset class. 
We all understood that borrowers were exposed to rising interest rates. And we all 
knew that home prices would not rise at double digit rates forever. But it took a 
long time to see the problem.11  
 
Faced with such uncertainty and, as policymakers, the task of responding, policymakers 
do not “grasp at straws”—they are usually not willing to try anything. Instead, they manage the 
uncertainty by transforming a “problematic situation into a determinate situation,” that is, into a 
meaningful situation to which they can justifiably respond (Dewey [1939] 2013: 102; Mills 
1940: 907).  
A problematic situation is transformed into a determinate situation by defining it. 
Defining a policymaking situation is what Lamont, Beljean, and Clair (2014) call a cultural 
process. These are processes based on “inter-subjective meaning-making: they take shape 
through the mobilization of shared categories and classification systems” (574). There are two 
important elements in this process. One is the element of inter-subjectivity. As Norton (2014) 
argues, state action involves the coordination of a “complex network of actors” and is not a 
matter of the “will and ingenuity” of individual state actors (1538, 1560). The definition of a 
policymaking situation is negotiated inter-subjectively—it proceeds within a group of 
policymakers and coordinates their actions as a result. The culture operating in the mind of any 
                                                
9 FDIC 11/2/2006 
10 Federal Reserve 12/12/2006 
11 FDIC 6/21/2007 
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one policymaker will influence but not determine the result of the process. Also, bearing in mind 
that the process of defining a situation unfolds amid uncertainty and ambiguity, individuals are 
not likely to be clear in their own minds what is going on or what their interests are. 
Nevertheless, once a particular situation is evoked, social actors operate based on that situation 
and have strong sense of what should and should not be done in such a situation (Swidler 2008). 
In addition, Mears (2011) argues that, for the most part, this is a non-cynical process in that 
actors come to actually see the situation as defined. 
A second important element of the process is shared meanings and categories. Early 
pragmatists imagined social actors’ creativity as more or less limitless. However, Mills (1940) 
argues that creativity and experimentation in developing new lines of action are constrained by 
the language available to discuss possible responses and to justify those responses after the fact. 
Similarly, Norton (2014) argues that state actors in the early English empire were “constrained 
by existing codes of state meaning making” in developing effective ways to deal with pirates 
(1560). McDonnell, Bail, and Tavory (2014) describe moments of solving a situation as “Aha!” 
moments (4). These are moments in which the application of particular meanings gives shape to 
an ambiguous situation, bringing a line of action into focus. The coordination of policymaking 
and policy implementation is generally carried out at the organizational level in the U.S. For 
example, HUD creates and implements housing policy. The Fed decides and implements 
monetary policy. As the housing market collapsed, policymakers within these agencies were 
trying to figure out how their organization should respond. Thus, the potentially relevant shared 
meanings leading to “Ah” moments in defining the housing market situation are likely to be 
shared at the organizational level and embedded in an organization’s experience with the housing 
market (Kane 1997; McDonnell, Bail, and Tavory 2014: 8). 
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DATA AND METHODS 
This is a case study of crisis policymaking. I examine the policymaking of four federal agencies 
during the recent crisis, thus I also have the benefit of comparison. There are two main purposes 
for which case studies are the best tool. One is when working within well-developed theoretical 
areas and the other is when generating understanding of complex social processes (Feagin, 
Orum, and Sjoberg 1991; Ragin and Becker 1992; for examples see: Fourcade 2011; Steensland 
2006; Vaughan 2006). These purposes require the deep examination afforded by a case study. 
Often these two purposes overlap as in the current article, which seeks to specify the complex 
social process of defining and responding to a policymaking problem and in so doing contribute 
to the well-developed theoretical areas of organizational theory, policymaking, and culture.  
 The examination of the policymaking of all four agencies in this case focuses on the 
relationship the agencies had with the housing markets before the problems became apparent, 
how the agencies talk about the problems once they began to unfold, and what policy responses 
they supported or avoided. The goal, as Fourcade (2011) calls it, is the “comprehensive empirical 
cycle” (1724). Which requires identifying a particular process—the cultural process of defining a 
crisis policymaking problem—and understanding what goes in (cultural meanings available to a 
group of policymakers), what comes out (that is, what substantively gets constructed in the 
process of defining a policymaking problem), and what are the consequences. 
 The analysis in this article draws on over one hundred primary and secondary sources on 
the housing and financial crisis and the four government agencies at the center of the crisis 
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policymaking.12 In addition to the examination of this encompassing set of primary and 
secondary material, I sought verification of nascent conclusions in a more bounded set of 
material that could be compared across the four agencies —the complete set of public speeches 
and congressional testimony (just “speeches” going forward) given by any official from the four 
agencies during the period of January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2009. This complete set of 
speeches totaled 1,740 and could be reasonably compared because officials from all four 
agencies give public speeches and provide congressional testimony. See table 2 for the number 
of speeches given by each agency. 
 Table 2. Number of public addresses contributed by each government agency. 
Agency Number of Addresses 
Number of 
Official Speakers 
FDIC 151 12 
Federal Reserve 419 26 
Treasury 
HUD 
824 
346 
42 
46 
Total 1,740 126 
Note: 47 of the 419 Fed addresses are from the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York (FRBNY). 7 of the 26 Fed speakers are FRBNY officials. 
 
 
These data are substantively important in this study because public addresses are the main 
vehicle through which policymakers define the situation for themselves and others. Policy action 
requires the coordinated effort of many individuals and that coordination occurs “around public, 
                                                
12 Sources include: reports, for example, a 2011 Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
report on the foreclosure crisis and reports from the Special Inspector General of the Troubled 
Assets Relief Program (SIGTARP); press releases, for example, the 2007 Treasury Department 
announcement of FHASecure, a mortgage refinancing program. I also relied heavily on the 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting transcripts as well as the Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission (FCIC) material, which included interviews with top government officials. 
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collective meanings” (Norton 2014: 1544). As former Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, once 
put it, speeches are “where policy is made” (Acheson 1960: 44).  
 I employ emerging computational tools to collect and analyze these speech data. To 
collect the data, I wrote a Python script that would scrape the text of each speech from the four 
agencies websites. I use Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) topic modeling to systematically and 
inductively code the speeches for various themes (Blei 2012; DiMaggio, Nag, and Blei 2013: 
576; Mohr and Bogdanov 2013). The final result is similar to a set of themes or topics that a 
researcher reading the speeches might identify. With topic modeling, the topics are determined 
inductively by the model. This is useful because topics may be revealed that neither the 
producers of the text nor the analyst were necessarily expecting (DiMaggio, Nag, and Blei 2013; 
McFarland et al. 2013). For a more technical explanation of LDA, see Appendix B.  
 This computational classification of the text into topics allows for a comprehensive, 
overall picture of themes in the speeches. I use these topic classifications for two purposes. One 
is as a map of the over 3.5 million words in the text, which I use as a guide for further analysis. 
For example, several topics were housing market related and I could identify which speeches 
discussed those topics for more in-depth reading. Secondly, I use the topic model results to 
present a descriptive picture of 1) which policies the four agencies advocated and 2) what issues 
each agency was focused on in 2006, before the crisis. Appendix B contains a table of the top 
words in a select set of topics referred to in the article as well as additional information about the 
topics displayed in figures 1 and 2 below.  
 The definitions of the situation and embedded pre-crisis meanings presented in the 
following results section are identified through an iterative process of reading speeches and 
computationally searching them for occurrences of particular words or phrases and vice versa. 
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For example, since “lower income borrower” appeared as a relatively frequent tri-gram13 in the 
agencies speeches, I accessed all of the speeches in which the tri-gram appeared and examined 
the context. Conversely, if “financial innovation” was an important phrase in a particular speech, 
I would determine whether it appeared elsewhere and, if so, in what context. Through this 
iterative process and an expansive reading of material outside of the speeches, I developed an 
understanding of these agencies’ engagements with the housing markets before the crisis, their 
understanding of the unfolding problems, as well as how they viewed potential solutions. These 
analyses and data provide evidence of policymakers’ available pre-crisis cultural meanings, their 
definitions of the crisis, and the policies they advocated. 
 
 
THE CRISIS RESPONSES 
 
There were two main policy approaches—counseling and mortgage modification—advocated by 
these agencies in response to the housing market crisis. The counseling approach focused on 
making sure that borrowers had information about their mortgages and their options. The role 
that policymakers played in this approach was in facilitating the flow of information. Either by 
training and providing mortgage counselors or by adjusting the information that lenders were 
required to share with borrowers. The biggest crisis effort under the counseling approach was the 
HOPE NOW Alliance. The Alliance brought together mortgage market participants including, 
lenders, servicers, and securitizers. The idea of the Alliance was to develop and share best 
practices for dealing with delinquent borrowers. The Alliance also included an outreach effort 
aimed at getting borrowers to talk with mortgage counselors about their options.  
                                                
13 n-grams are a sequence of n contiguous words, often ignoring stop words. n-grams are used by 
social scientists as units of meaning (Grimmer and Stewart 2013).  
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 The Alliance was not a government intervention. It was an effort in which policymakers 
played a coordinating role but was otherwise implemented by the mortgage industry. As 
Treasury explained, “We have been meeting with the nation's leading mortgage counselors, 
mortgage servicers, lenders, investors and other industry experts to explore their ideas on how to 
reach and help homeowners.”14 HUD did prod the industry to do more, “So we have encouraged 
the mortgage industry to be aggressive.”15 
 The mortgage modification approach involved changing the terms of borrowers’ 
mortgages in various ways. A modification could mean extending or making permanent the 
“teaser” interest rate on an adjustable-rate mortgage; it could mean extending the timeframe of 
the loan from, say, thirty years to forty-five; it could also mean writing down the principle 
balance on the loan, i.e. forgiving some of the mortgage debt. Policymakers were in conflict over 
the government’s role in this policy approach. The Fed, Treasury, and HUD all supported 
mortgage modifications in general but they held the position that any modifications should be 
carried out voluntarily by lenders. Treasury called for more modifications to be done but left it to 
investors to demand the modifications from servicers, “Investors must take an active role in 
demanding that all mortgage servicers, large or small, are pursuing all available loss mitigation 
strategies. We have an immediate need to see more loan modifications and refinancing and other 
flexibility.” The Fed also encouraged lenders and servicers to apply modifications but left it to 
industry participants to determine when modification was appropriate, “Often, loan workouts are 
in the interest of all parties. We have also encouraged lenders and servicers to identify and 
                                                
14 Treasury 10/10/2007 
15 HUD 10/31/2007 
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contact borrowers who, with counseling and possible loan modifications, may be able to avoid 
entering delinquency or foreclosure.”  
 The FDIC also initially advocated for lenders and servicers to voluntarily modify 
mortgages, however, they were more direct from the beginning in instructing large-scale and 
specific modifications, “Specifically, we are suggesting that some of these hybrid loans – the so 
called 2/28s and 3/27s – can be restructured, and foreclosure avoided…loan servicers should 
convert them to fixed rate mortgages.”16 While HUD was “pleased with [the industry’s] 
response,”17 the FDIC was not, “Frankly, I'm frustrated that the servicing restructuring has not 
reached the level that I had hoped it would…We have a huge problem on our hands.  We can't 
just sit here doing this kind of case by case, laborious restructuring process with all these 
millions of subprime hybrid ARMs.”18  
 By early 2008, the FDIC shifted to outlining specific programs by which the federal 
government could intervene to modify mortgages, including a proposal to write down principle 
balances by twenty percent. In outlining these options, the FDIC explained, “While significant, 
direct government intervention into the mortgage markets should be avoided unless absolutely 
necessary, current circumstances may dictate that the federal government take a more direct role 
in facilitating solutions for many thousands of troubled mortgages to avoid more dire 
consequences for all Americans.”19  
 
                                                
16 FDIC 11/5/2007 
17 HUD 10/312007 
18 FDIC 10/4/2007 
19 FDIC 4/9/2008; FDIC 4/16/2008 
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Figure 1. Emphasis on Modification and Counseling Policy Topics by Agency Over Crisis 
Period. The proportion of the agencies’ speeches on either topic have been normalized to account 
for the variation across the agencies in the total number of speeches that they gave. Thus the y-
axis represents an agency’s proportional emphasis on the policy approaches. The numbers are 
not shown on the y-axis because they are meaningful only relatively since the data have been 
normalized. 
 
 Figure 1 shows the emphasis that each agency gave to each policy approach throughout 
the crisis. The shaded areas show how much each agency discussed each policy approach 
throughout the crisis.20 The x-axis represents time and each point along the x-axis is a speech. 
                                                
20 The numbers are not shown on the y-axis because they are meaningful only relatively since the 
data have been normalized to reflect an agency’s proportional emphasis on the policy 
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The y-axis shows the proportion of the agencies’ speeches on either topic and have been 
normalized to account for the variation across the agencies in the total number of speeches that 
they gave. The percents in each of the panels give the average percent that an agency’s speeches 
were constituted by the given policy approach.21  
 This figure shows that the FDIC and HUD were the main advocates of the crisis policies 
but that they favored different approaches. The FDIC favored the modification approach, 
spending an average of nineteen percent of each speech on the modification topic. HUD spent an 
average of nineteen percent of each speech on the counseling approach. The Fed and Treasury 
proportionally discussed both policy approaches less than the FDIC and HUD. Their discussions 
of these policy approaches peaked at the moments of critical developments in the crisis: in the 
summer of 2007, following the BNP Paribus event (see page 12 above) and at the end of 2007 
when policymakers assessed “The housing decline … as the most significant current risk to our 
economy.”22  
 As Treasury and the Fed began implementing direct, innovative interventions to stabilize 
financial markets, they and HUD continued to resist calls for government-led modifications.23 
Officials acknowledged that Americans expected them to address the problem—HUD said 
“[H]omeowners…are worried, very worried, about their homes and their families. They want 
                                                                                                                                                       
approaches, taking into account the variation across agencies in the total number of speeches 
they give. 
21 To calculate the percents, I only included speeches from April 1, 2007, even though all 
speeches are plotted from the beginning of 2006. By April, 2007, all agencies recognized that a 
problem was underway, thus the percents more accurately measure the percent of speech time 
each agency gave to the given housing policy approach. 
22 Treasury 10/16/2007 
23 The Fed announced its unprecedented currency swap lines with four other central banks on 
December 12, 2007. See the press release: 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20071212a.htm 
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real solutions. They want to know…that we are doing something.” In spite of Treasury’s 
acknowledgement that private sector efforts would not solve the problem: “The efforts of this 
private sector [HOPE NOW] alliance alone will not solve the problem,” they made no moves for 
more direct government intervention. More aggressive government intervention did not make 
sense based on the Fed, HUD, and Treasury’s definitions of the situation in the housing market.  
 
 
TRANSFORMING A PROBLEMATIC SITUATION INTO A DETERMINATE SITUATION 
 
Particularly if a problem develops in a policy arena that is not a policymaker’s main focus, 
external actors may initially be the ones pushing for new solutions. During the recent crisis, 
external actors—most notably Congress—pushed the agencies to say how they were addressing 
the situation. Policymakers first reacted by highlighting their current engagements with the 
housing markets. For example, the Fed had recently expanded an extensive review of required 
disclosures for credit card terms to include mortgage terms, with the intent of reforming those 
requirements going forward if they were found lacking.24   
 However, as mortgage defaults and foreclosures continued rising, the agencies had to say 
how their efforts would address “current borrower distress”25 or “troubled borrowers.”26 The 
Fed, for example, said, “I would like to say a few words about what the Federal Reserve is doing 
to help borrowers who may be facing difficulty paying their mortgages.”27 If policymakers did 
not have in-progress lines of policy action that could be applied or adjusted to address current 
borrowers being unable to make mortgage payments, they had to “look for answers” to this 
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26 Federal Reserve 11/5/2007 
27 Federal Reserve 10/11/2007 
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problem (Mills 1940; Scheniderhan 2011). Whether the impetus for new solutions comes from 
within a policymaking organization or externally, policymakers tackle the uncertainty and 
ambiguity of an unfolding situation by defining it in order to respond.   
 There are two main components constituting officials’ definitions, which varied between 
the FDIC and the other policymakers, that shaped their responses to current borrower distress: a 
sense of mortgage borrowers and whether they could or should be helped, as well as a sense of 
mortgage lenders and whether just a few bad actors engaged in questionable lending practices or 
whether there was a widespread problem.  
  
Borrowers: consumer choice, speculators, and underwater mortgages 
 
Consumers making choices is how Treasury, the Fed, and HUD understood mortgage borrowers. 
For these policymakers, mortgage borrowers are consumers making personal choices about 
available financial products and they are responsible for the consequences of those choices, even 
if they turn out to have been poor choices. There is little that the government should do when 
consumers make poor choices. In fact, if the government did step in and protect consumers from 
their misguided choices, this would create moral hazard: “I know there are some who are calling 
for a sub prime rescue … While I have sympathy for people who are in a tricky situation, I 
strongly disagree with that a bailout is the answer … There is a reason it is called ‘moral 
hazard.’”28  Further, in the case of the recent crisis, government intervention would reward 
speculators. 
 In the U.S., HUD explained, borrowers have choices: “Americans are able to live where 
they want, and buy what they want. But they also must accept the consequences of those 
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decisions.”29 Similarly, Treasury pointed out that, “consumers can choose from mortgage 
products designed to match their desired payment characteristics.”30 The Fed agreed, “Having a 
wide variety of mortgage types assists consumers in finding a way to finance the purchase of a 
home that best meets their own financial and lifestyle requirements.” HUD emphasized that 
subprime lending opened up the option of homeownership to those who did not have that choice 
before: “Subprime loans have helped many Americans buy a home who, in the past, might have 
been shut out of the market.”31 The Fed noted, however, that consumers not considering all of 
their options could be problematic, “But some consumers do not actively shop for a lender …and 
do not compare loan terms in light of their personal circumstances. Instead they rely on one 
lender and accept the mortgage loan presented to them. Mortgages that are appropriate for one 
borrower, however, may create problems for another.”32   
 Officials recognized that the options borrowers have are complex, “the growing 
complexity of products makes it a bigger challenge for borrowers to understand the 
characteristics of competing products.”33 Treasury notes that the process of getting a mortgage 
“can be extremely complicated.”34 Even so, “that in no way excuses homebuyers from their 
obligation for due diligence.”35 The Fed similarly recognized that borrowers “may simply have 
not understood the sometimes complex terms of the contracts they signed.”36 Nevertheless, 
“People should bear the consequences of their decisions about lending, borrowing, and managing 
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their portfolios, both when those decisions turn out to be wise and when they turn out to be ill 
advised.”37    
 What consumers need in order to make wise choices is information. “It is simply that we 
need to know more now … It is as if every American has awoken to find himself or herself 
promoted to the position of CFO of his or her own household.”38 “Buying a home is often the 
biggest purchase most of us will make in our lifetime, and information is critical to ensuring that 
we make this purchase wisely.”39 With information, what might in some cases be “abusive 
practices… can be beneficial to at least some consumers. For example, an informed borrower 
might choose a loan with a prepayment penalty in exchange for a lower interest rate or lower 
closing costs.”40 HUD is less ambivalent about potential abuse in mortgage markets but in any 
case, consumers need information to protect themselves: “Americans need to be educated to spot 
bad actors.”41  
 The counseling policy approach to the crisis follows from an understanding of mortgage 
borrowers as consumers making choices and informed consumers making wise choices. In this 
crisis policy approach, borrowers are still responsible for considering options: “We want these 
homeowners to begin paying attention to their mortgage statements and talk to their lenders to 
determine their options early in the process.”42 With the counseling approach, borrowers still 
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41 HUD 8/28/2007 
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have choices to make and the sooner that a borrower “reaches out to explore financial options, 
the more likely he or she will be able to find an affordable mortgage solution.”43  
 A different crisis approach that involved more government intervention than counseling 
did not make sense to these policymakers because such an approach, in addition to creating 
moral hazard among consumers who had failed to do their due diligence, it would also reward 
speculators (Swagel 2009). Even if some consumers seemed to warrant sympathy—”particularly 
those who may have fewer alternatives, such as lower income families”44—there were also 
“speculators … who committed fraud.”45 Treasury was careful to point out that some borrowers 
“have made bets on the housing market, buying up multiple houses expecting to make a profit.”46 
And Treasury did not intend on “assist[ing] speculators who acquired real estate for investment 
purposes.”47 The Fed made the same point, “Some borrowers were actually investors utilizing 
the ease in terms to purchase investment and rental properties.”48  
 Understanding borrowers as consumers choosing products that meet their interests, 
especially if some of the borrowers are speculative investors, contributes to a definition of the 
situation in which borrowers/investors could be expected to rationally choose to abandon their 
house (Swagel 2009). The Fed explained early rising defaults and foreclosure, in part, by 
borrowers walking away: “Some borrowers (particularly owner investors) may have found that 
                                                
43 Treasury 10/10/2007 
44 Federal Reserve 11/5/2007 
45 Treasury 11/2/2007 
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47 Treasury 12/11/2007 
48 Federal Reserve 3/22/2007, see also Federal Reserve 3/27/2007, Federal Reserve 3/28/2007, 
Federal Reserve 9/11/2007, Federal Reserve 11/5/2007 
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simply walking away from their properties was their best option.”49 Although the Fed expected 
walking away to be “particularly likely for those who purchased properties purely for investment 
purposes,” any borrower who found themselves “‘under water’ that is, the house is worth less 
than the mortgage balance may be tempted to walk away from their loans.”50 Thus, HUD 
explained that it “more than likely cannot and should not try to help those subprime borrowers 
who: … Are involved in speculative investments … or who lack sufficient positive equity in 
their homes.”51 This conception of borrowers strongly influenced whether particular housing 
market policies made sense to these policymakers (Swagel 2009).   
 While the FDIC similarly understood mortgage borrowers as consumers making choices, 
they outlined several factors that they understood to constrain consumers’ choices. One factor 
working against borrowers, as the FDIC saw it, was housing affordability. “The historic boom 
we saw in home prices … pushed up the price of homeownership beyond the means of many 
families ... particularly those at or below the median income level. One market response to this 
… was the wider use of products that reduced monthly mortgage payments for a limited time.”52 
 The FDIC noted the complexity of mortgage products, as did the other policymakers. 
However, rather than see that such complexity does not excuse borrowers their due diligence, the 
FDIC emphasized that complexity “can lead to poor product choices for consumers who do not 
fully understand them.”53 Additionally, while the Fed outlined situations in which informed 
consumers may knowingly choose ostensibly unfavorable mortgage terms, the FDIC instead 
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assumed that “many borrowers who opt for [such a] product … do not understand … the other 
options available to them.”54 
 In addition to the complexity of mortgage products, the FDIC also considered that 
“aggressive or misleading marketing can have a negative impact on the ability of borrowers to 
make informed credit decisions.”55 The FDIC further said that marketing could influence even 
“cautious” borrowers: “Marketing materials are often crafted to induce even cautious borrowers 
into inappropriate products.”56 While the Fed also discussed “marketing,” they did not negatively 
characterize the marketing as the FDIC did, referring only to “the marketing of [mortgage] 
products to a wider spectrum of borrowers.”57 
 A final factor limiting borrowers’ choices, according to the FDIC, is lack of access to 
low-cost, traditional mortgage products rather than high-cost ones. The FDIC cited Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data, which “indicate[d] that higher priced loans are 
disproportionately made to minorities and lower income households.”58 The FDIC explicitly 
connected the findings from the HMDA data to the housing market situation: “These [HMDA] 
data suggest that racial minorities bear a disproportionate impact of recent subprime lending 
practices.” Which, for the FDIC, “represent[ed] an important dimension of this issue.”59 
 The modification policy approach that the FDIC advocated follows from their 
understanding of borrowers as “trapped”60 in unaffordable mortgages because of conditions and 
                                                
54 FDIC 3/27/2007 
55 FDIC 3/27/2007, see also FDIC 4/30/2007 
56 FDIC 3/27/2007 
57 Federal Reserve 3/27/2007; see also, Federal Reserve 10/11/2007, Federal Reserve 5/23/2007  
58 FDIC 3/27/2007 
59 FDIC 5/31/2007; see also FDIC 11/27/2007 
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factors beyond their control. The FDIC supported other policymakers’ efforts to expand 
counseling but that alone would not be enough. As the FDIC understood the situation, counseling 
and additional consumer protection regulations “will help protect future borrowers. However, the 
task at hand is to find ways to help borrowers currently in financial distress.”61 In order to help 
these borrowers, “it [would] be necessary to consider loan modifications … to make these loans 
affordable to the borrowers.”62 The FDIC felt it was necessary to “encourage servicers to 
conduct modifications that are in the best interest of the borrower,”63 emphasizing that borrowers 
needed to be “better serve[d].”64 
 The different conception that the FDIC had of borrowers compared to other policymakers 
is also reflected in the FDIC’s references to underwater borrowers. Other policymakers had 
difficultly imagining that underwater borrowers would not abandon their houses (and thus 
mortgages) and assessed policy options accordingly. The FDIC, on the other hand, listed 
underwater borrowers among the other “hundreds of thousands of lower income borrowers who 
are at risk of losing their homes in today's sinking housing market.”65 The FDIC acknowledged 
speculative and fraudulent activity “particularly [among loans] that exhibited early payment 
default.” Further, the FDIC agreed, “It would be hard to argue that these borrowers deserve the 
same type of assistance that might be appropriate for borrowers who acted in good faith.”66 
Unlike other policymakers, however, the FDIC did not expect underwater borrowers to walk 
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away from their houses. To the contrary, they were “particularly at risk because they have very 
little financial cushion.”67 
 
Lenders: market pressures, some bad actors, or widespread elementary predatory lending  
 
Officials explained that the higher than usual rates of subprime mortgage defaults was, at least in 
part, because of “lax” or “loose” underwriting.68 The impetus for the “slippage in underwriting 
standards”69 came from certain developments in the mortgage markets. Officials from all four 
agencies were generally in agreement about these developments as well as their affects on 
lending standards. Everyone agreed that “excess capacity” or a “fall in demand” from mortgage 
borrowers in the mid-2000s led to “intense lender competition.” Lenders struggled to maintain 
origination volume at a time when investor demand for mortgage-backed securities was growing. 
Lenders responded to these market pressures by “extending loans to subprime borrowers” and 
“easing lending standards as they competed to attract borrowers.”70 Another major 
development—securitization and the originate-and-distribute model for mortgage lending—led 
to “some misalignment of incentives.” Though the Fed and treasury emphasized the 
misalignment between lenders and investors, while the FDIC emphasized the misalignment 
between lenders and borrowers. The Fed characterized the misalignment as “a classic principal 
agent problem … originators (the agents) do not have a sufficient incentive to shield the owners 
of the securities (the principals) from suffering higher than expected losses [from] loosening 
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69 Federal Reserve 8/31/2007 
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underwriting standards.”71 The FDIC said, “Lenders that retain the mortgages they originate have 
interests more aligned with those of borrowers … However, in the case of loans sold on the 
secondary market … the lender's preferences are heavily influenced by what market investors 
want to buy, which may not match what is appropriate for the borrower.”72   
 While all policymakers recognized weakened underwriting, even some abusive or unfair 
lending practices, the FDIC and the other agencies’ definitions reflected different conceptions of 
how widespread lender malfeasance was. The Fed, Treasury, and HUD saw any malfeasance as 
more isolated, confined to only “some lenders” and “bad actors” (Blinder 2015: 140).73 HUD 
referred to only “some lenders and brokers [who] pushed the envelope.”74 Indeed, HUD 
mentioned only “one lender [who] bragged of his ‘NINJA’ loans.”75 The Fed and Treasury, 
similarly, explained, “The practices of some mortgage originators have also contributed to the 
problems in the subprime sector.”76 Further, any “excess” by lenders seemed to be nullified by 
equal “excess” on the part of borrowers. HUD said, “ There have been excesses by both lenders 
and consumers.”77 Treasury agreed, “ I have no doubt that some mortgage brokers and 
originators engaged in deceptive and predatory practices … Just as important, and not said as 
often, I have no doubt that there was an abundance of borrower level fraud as well.”78 
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 In contrast, the FDIC saw “widespread failure” among lenders.79 Instead of a few bad 
actors, the FDIC explained, “These companies used to be relatively small and unsophisticated, 
but today they have grown to be large, highly sophisticated and highly aggressive marketers of 
high cost financial services and products … They have come to dominate the financial services 
markets in [certain] neighborhoods.”80 Further, HUD dramatically distinguished the few bad 
actors as “slick and sinister predatory lenders.” The FDIC, on the other hand, saw more banal 
evil, “the most elementary notion of predatory lending – failure to underwrite based on the 
borrower's ability to pay – became prevalent in the subprime mortgage market.”81 The FDIC also 
saw lenders as more culpable than the other agencies did. While the Fed suggested, “lenders, 
investors, and ratings agencies … may have underestimated the risk involved,”82 the FDIC said, 
“many risk management fundamentals were ignored.” Even more explicitly, “Lenders and Wall 
Street understood the risks associated in funding these mortgages.”83  
 The Fed, Treasury, and HUD defined borrowers as consumers making choices and only 
some lenders as engaging in abusive practices. In such situation, the best solution is better-
informed consumers: “Of course, knowledge is also our best protection against predatory lenders 
and fraud.”84 With “counseling about mortgage products and the responsibilities of 
homeownership,”85 borrowers could be “ empowered with the tools to know when to spot a 
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sham.”86 Counseling consumers would not only empower consumers to protect themselves but 
by would also “strengthen market competition.”87 Informed consumers were a better solution 
than more aggressive government intervention because there could be negative unintended 
consequences: “While [increased delinquencies and foreclosures] are serious problems, the 
[Federal Reserve] Board believes they need to be addressed in a way that preserves incentives 
for responsible subprime lenders so that borrowers with non prime credit can become 
homeowners … It is important that any actions we might take … do not have unintended 
consequences.”88 HUD agreed “most of the sub prime loans” are “financially responsible loans” 
and HUD stressed that “We can't abandon the American Dream. Americans who are turned away 
from the prime lenders still deserve a chance at the Dream.  So you will never hear me say that 
all subprime lenders are bad.”89   
 The FDIC defined the situation differently, as one in which lender “abuses [] are strong 
and consistent across industry and regulatory lines,” such that “it is difficult even for 
sophisticated consumers to fully understand the costs associated with particular credit options or 
to compare alternative products.”90 Further, if lenders sold mortgage products that “were never 
designed to be affordable at the fully indexed rate”91 and there was a “widespread practice of 
qualifying borrowers based only on their ability to make payments at the starter rate,”92 then the 
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policy response needs to involve “restructur[ing mortgages] into more affordable loans.”93 Why 
did the FDIC’s sense of lenders and borrowers differ in these ways from the sense the other 
policymakers had?  
 
A familiar problem 
 
HUD, compared with the other policymakers, experienced the collapsing housing market as a 
familiar problem for which they had a ready policy response. HUD had an answer to the 
questions about how their policies could address current borrower distress. First, HUD was 
already involved with counseling potential homeowners long before the crisis unfolded. In early 
2006, while HUD and others were still touting the record rates of homeownership, HUD also 
discussed their efforts in “housing counseling that has been so useful in helping families prepare 
for homeownership, avoid predatory lending practices, and avoid default on their homes.”94 
Additionally, HUD spent 2006 advocating for reforming the rules for Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) mortgage insurance, which HUD manages. HUD appealed for FHA 
reform in this way: “without a viable FHA, many homebuyers—first time homebuyers, minority 
homebuyers and homebuyers with less than perfect credit—were left with fewer safe and 
affordable options.”95  
 In familiar situations, a coherent definition of the situation in not necessary because 
actors already know what to do. As Swidler (1986) explains, in “settled times,” culture is used to 
sustain the ready response. HUD mobilized certain meanings and categories, as can be seen in 
the quotes above: “minority homebuyers” and “safe and affordable options.” But these meanings 
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are mobilized to support policy actions already underway. It is only in “unsettled times” that 
cultural meaning needs to be weaved into a more coherent definition that provides direction for 
policymaking.  
 For HUD, although there was a “subprime problem,” it did not require much explaining. 
HUD referred simply to “growth” or the “red hot housing market” which “couldn't generate heat 
forever.” HUD frequently stressed that mostly everything is fine: “So I am here today to tell you 
that the sky hasn't fallen. But we do need to take measures not just to promote homeownership 
but to protect it for the long term.” Further, counseling and FHA reform are what is needed: “we 
pushed for more housing counseling the last few years. And [] we have been pushing for Federal 
Housing Administration reform for two years now. We anticipated this problem.”96 
 
 
PRE-CRISIS ENGAGEMENTS AND EMBEDDED CULTURAL MEANINGS 
 
The cultural meanings and categories that policymakers draw on to define uncertain situations 
are embedded in their previous and on-going engagements. Policymakers were engaged in many 
issues and with the housing market itself in various ways before the crisis. Figure 2, on the 
following page, shows the topics that agencies focused on throughout 2006.  
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Figure 2. 2006 Topics by Agency. This shows the average percent that an agency’s speeches in 
2006 were on the given topic. A select set of topics are shown: the top three topics for each 
agency as well as any housing related topics that an agency discussed at least 1% on average in 
2006. 
 
This figure shows the percent of each speech that an agency devoted to a given topic, on average, 
throughout 2006. The figure displays a select set of topics: the top three topics for each agency as 
well as any housing market-related topic. For example, as banking regulators, the Basel II bank 
capital reform was a relatively important topic for the FDIC and the Fed. The FDIC devoted an 
average of 23% of each speech in 2006 to the reform, while the Fed devoted an average of 9% of 
each speech to this issue. The Fed spent a little more time, on average, discussing the state of the 
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economy and global capital flow. Treasury spent the most amount of time in 2006 discussing 
fiscal policy. And HUD most often discussed its homeless housing and other housing programs. 
The FDIC, the Fed, and Treasury were all engaged in “monitoring” the housing markets.97 This 
engagement is reflected in Figure 2 by the housing markets topic. Other than monitoring, 
Treasury’s other engagement with the housing markets in 2006 was advocating for reforming the 
Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.98 HUD, in addition to 
its on-going housing programs, was pushing for updating the rules regarding insuring mortgages; 
this is reflected in the mortgage insurance topic in figure 2.  
 An important housing market issue for the FDIC and the Fed in 2006 was consumer 
credit. Part of the Fed and the FDIC’s job as banking regulators is to enforce lending standards 
and they spent 2006 developing and issuing guidance regarding certain mortgage lending 
practices.99 The consumer credit issue, for the FDIC, also included addressing payday lending 
and other “high-cost” financial services products.100 For the Fed, the consumer credit issue 
included improving consumer disclosures on credit card terms and, beginning in mid-2006, 
mortgages.101 All of the agencies spent some time in 2006 discussing their efforts at improving 
financial literacy. 
                                                
97 FDIC 9/13/2006; Federal Reserve 2/15/2006; Treasury 5/9/2006 
98 The advocacy for reforming Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac followed the accounting scandals 
both were involved in the early 2000s. Policymakers pushed to establish a new, more powerful 
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these reforms.  
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100 FDIC 5/3/2006; see also FDIC 9/27/2006; FDIC 11/30/2006 
101 For a report on the credit card disclosure review, see: 
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 Information played an important role in the Fed and Treasury’s pre-crisis engagements 
with the housing market. Information was associated with making good financial choices. 
Treasury emphasized its role in “provid[ing] our citizens with the right tools that can teach them 
how to make sound financial decisions.”102 The Fed agreed that “financial literacy” was “a 
source of better decisionmaking by consumers.”103 Treasury’s hope was that consumers would 
be able to use financial information skills to improve their own lives: “we hope that through our 
emphasis on increased financial literacy people gain the skills to make better decisions and live 
better lives.”104 For the Fed, there was another benefit of having informed consumers in the 
financial services marketplace: “Informed financial decisionmaking is also vital for the healthy 
functioning of financial markets. Like any other businesses, financial service firms will provide 
better products at better prices when they are subject to market pressures imposed on them by 
informed consumers.”105 
 Information was especially critical for marginal borrowers who more recently gained 
access to credit as a result of innovations in financial services provision. “Nontraditional 
mortgages … have been available for many years, and are beneficial for some borrowers because 
of the payment flexibility they offer. … [T]oday these products are being offered to a wider 
spectrum of consumers, including borrowers for whom these types of mortgages may be ill 
suited.” Given these new developments, the Fed “urge[d] institutions to ensure that their … 
communications are consistent with the product terms…This is important so that consumers have 
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the information they need at critical decision times.”106 Importantly, information would “ help 
consumers recognize and avoid abusive practices in the financial institutions arena.”107  
 Although recognition of the potential for abuse appeared in the Fed and Treasury’s pre-
crisis engagements, more prominent were positive meanings of financial innovations. As the Fed 
explained, “Financial innovations have been coming at a rapid pace in recent years…we have 
seen a proliferation of new lending products in the United States, including home equity lines of 
credit, interest only and even negative amortization mortgages, and subprime mortgages and 
consumer loans.”108  Treasury agreed that “new financial products, which enhance welfare, are 
being invented every year.”109  
 Increased access and choice were among the most important meanings associated with 
financial innovation for the Fed and Treasury:  
Technological advances have dramatically transformed the provision of financial 
products and services in recent years. To cite just one example, the expanded use 
of computerized credit scoring models, by reducing the costs of making loans and 
by increasing the range of assets that lenders can sell on the secondary market, 
has made possible the extension of credit to a larger group of borrowers.110  
 
Treasury said, “It is first important to note that millions of Americans have been able to 
move into homeownership because of these products.”111 Expanded access and choice, in 
mostly any form, were positive: “Payday lending outlets, a source of credit that was 
almost non existent a decade ago, now number more than 10,000.”112 The Fed 
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highlighted the meanings of access and choice using a particularly catchy phrase: 
“Indeed, we have seen an increasingly wide array of products being offered to consumers 
across a range of incomes, leading to what has been called the democratization of credit 
[emphasis added].”113  
 In the FDIC’s pre-crisis engagements, information was less about educating consumers to 
take advantage of new financial products and more about “economic inclusion.”114 Information 
was associated with bringing “all consumers into the financial mainstream.”115 For the FDIC, 
“the importance of financial education [is] in leveling the playing field for consumers.”116 The 
FDIC associated more marginal borrowers with “feelings of exclusion, as well as cynicism about 
our free market society and the ability of all to participate and benefit.”117 In particular, the FDIC 
was concerned that “It almost seems as if the [financial services] market has become divided 
between two groups: those who successfully rely on banks for virtually cost free basic financial 
services, and those who pay high amounts.” 
 Higher-cost versus affordable were important meanings associated with financial services 
products. As a bank regulator, the FDIC stressed that banks “can provide a gateway into the 
financial mainstream for the unbanked….and provide an array of affordable lending services to 
meet the needs of all their customers.”118 This was important because “a significant portion of 
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the United States population lacks access to the banking system and spends significantly more on 
financial transactions as a result.”119 “Some pay 18 percent for a line of credit linked to their 
checking account; others pay 500 to 600 percent for a payday loan. … Some pay a flat 6.7 
percent for a fixed, 30 year mortgage and others pay balloon rates as high as 11.4 percent for an 
exotic alternative loan.”120  
 The FDIC was more ambivalent and wary about financial innovation and new financial 
products than the Fed and Treasury: “Innovation has brought more choice for consumers, it has 
also brought more complexity.”121 While innovations in credit scoring models were associated 
with the democratization of credit for other policymakers, for the FDIC: “Credit scoring models 
were developed for the credit card industry…and have not been fully tested as a predictor of 
default for loans that are such a large percentage of a borrower's income.”122 The FDIC 
associated developments in financial services with “A financial system that strips wealth and 
locks hardworking families into an endless cycle of debt and financial distress.”123 
  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
This article has examined how policymaking organizations defined the policymaking situation 
they faced and why they developed the particular policy responses they did. I have argued that 
policymakers faced with an uncertain situation will impose meaning on the situation by defining 
it in particular ways so that they can see a way to respond. The definitions of the policymaking 
                                                
119 FDIC 8/2/2006 
120 FDIC 11/30/2006 
121 FDIC 9/27/2006 
122 FDIC 9/20/2006 
123 FDIC 11/30/2006 
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situation are negotiated inter-subjectively, drawing on the cultural meanings and categories 
embedded in organizational experiences. These organizational-level meanings have coordinated 
previous engagements and are the most readily available to make sense of an unfolding situation 
and coordinate new responses. 
 More and more borrowers defaulting on their mortgages in 2006 and 2007 was an 
observable fact that resulted from the confluence of a particular set of socio-historical conditions 
and policymakers fairly early on came to agree on this set of conditions (see page 37 above). 
However, the sense of borrowers and lenders within this set of conditions is neither “automatic 
nor obvious” but is, however, highly consequential (Fourcade 2011; Hacking 1999; Norton 2014: 
1548). Categorizing borrowers as consumers responsible for their own financial decisions or as 
unsuspecting victims swept up in financial markets not designed for their benefit has vastly 
different implications for a justifiable policy response.  
 A pragmatist perspective addresses several important difficulties as well as clarifies the 
insights of contemporary theorizing on organizational action, culture, and policymaking. For 
one, organizational theorists have struggled with reconciling the seemingly contradictory 
phenomena of stability and change (Clemens and Cook 1999). Policy scholars have similarly 
struggled to account for incremental versus punctuated policy change (e.g. Fowler et al. 2017). 
From the pragmatist perspective, stability results when actors recognize situations as appropriate 
for established lines of action. As policy scholars have previously noted, external actors will 
sometimes contribute to a sense of appropriateness or inappropriateness of current policies 
(Redford 1969). In the recent crisis, if policymakers could not justifiably answer the question 
“what are you doing about rising foreclosures?” with slightly adjusted policies, then they had to 
come up with new ones.  
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Change is a potential result of policymakers developing new ways of dealing with a 
situation. However, a drastic break from previous policy is not likely if policymakers were 
already engaged in the policymaking arena before the crisis. As surprised as policymakers were 
about the particular way that socio-historical conditions came together and the consequences, 
they were nevertheless aware of and engaged with many of the separate conditions before hand. 
To reiterate an FDIC quote from above: “We all knew sub prime lending was a growing asset 
class. We all understood that borrowers were exposed to rising interest rates. And we all knew 
that home prices would not rise at double digit rates forever. But it took a long time to see the 
problem.”124 In those previous engagements, policymakers already had a sense of borrowers and 
lenders and even of their own responsibilities viz-a-viz borrowers and lenders. As policymakers 
worked to make sense of an unexpected situation in the housing markets, they drew on their 
sense of these more fundamental components of the situation.125  
Additionally, a pragmatist perspective clarifies the insight that culture’s influence is most 
prominent during “unsettled times,” that is, in unfamiliar situations. Swidler (1986) argues that in 
unsettled times, when actors are unsure of what to do, they explicitly follow “highly organized 
meaning systems” (278). The pragmatist perspective suggests that the highly organized meaning 
system that actors will follow is the constructed definition of the uncertain situation. We can see 
that in the case of the recent crisis because, as cultural scholars have long noted, culture’s 
influence is most visible during periods of contest (Alexander and Smith 1993: 166; Swidler 
                                                
124 FDIC 6/21/2007 
125 External actors can reject policymakers’ definitions of the situation and the new policy 
solutions, in which case change is more likely. But if the situation involves the arcane world of 
credit and financial markets and the policymakers are technocrats, external actors are less likely 
to be able to successfully reject new solutions.  
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1986). Organizational actors draw on the meanings embedded in their own experiences and when 
these meanings conflict—disagreement over the crisis policy response will be the result, as was 
the case between the FDIC and the others (Kane 1997).  
Lamont, Beljean, Clair (2014) argue that the frontier in understanding the (re)production 
of inequality is in identifying the “subtle and largely unconscious” processes that result in 
inequality. Processes such as defining a housing market crisis such that borrowers are seen as the 
beneficiaries of an expanded credit market and responsible for the consequences of the market 
risks they (knowingly or unknowingly) accept along with their mortgages. Unconsciously, 
policymakers continued to talk about homeownership as a wealth-building mechanism, as they 
have done in the U.S. for a long time (Quinn 2010) and to see expanded credit markets that open 
this opportunity to more borrowers as largely beneficial. However, the shift from mortgage 
markets being “facilitating” markets for homeowners to being facilitating markets for global 
investors has introduced new levels of volatility and supra-individual sources of risk without a 
new discussion of who should bear that risk.  
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FDIC 11/22/2007 Remarks by John F. Bovenzi, Deputy to the Chairman and Chief 
Operating Officer, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; 
Regulating the Frontiers of Competition in a Growing Economy; at 
the 2007 China International Banking Convention, Beijing, People’s 
Republic of China  
FDIC 11/27/2007 Remarks of Martin J. Gruenberg, Vice Chairman, Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the 
European Forum of Deposit Insurers, Istanbul, Turkey  
FDIC 4/9/2008  Statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation on Using FHA for Housing Stabilization and 
Homeownership Retention; before the Committee on Financial 
Services, U.S. House of Representatives; 2128 Rayburn House 
Office Building 
FDIC 4/16/2008 Statement of Arthur J. Murton, Director, Division of Insurance and 
Research, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on Hope for 
Homeowners Act of 2008; before the Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, 538 Dirksen Senate 
Office Building 
HUD 3/30/2006 Secretary Alphonso Jackson; Hearing On HUD’s Fiscal Year 2007 
Budget; Before the Committee on Financial Services U.S. House Of 
Representatives 
HUD 4/5/2006 Statement of Brian D. Montgomery Assistant Secretary for Housing 
- Federal Housing Commissioner; Hearing before the U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Financial Services Subcommittee on 
Housing and Community Opportunity 
HUD 6/20/2006 Statement of Brian D. Montgomery, Assistant Secretary for 
Housing - Federal Housing Commissioner, before the United States 
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
Subcommittee on Housing and Transportation 
HUD 2/15/2007 Statement of Orlando J. Cabrera Assistant Secretary for Public and 
Indian Housing Before the Committee on Indian Affairs United 
States Senate 
HUD 4/17/2007 Statement of Brian D. Montgomery, Assistant Secretary for 
Housing - Federal Housing Commissioner, before the House 
Committee on Financial Services, United States House of 
Representatives 
HUD 5/14/2007 Alphonso Jackson, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, 
at the Homeownership Summit, Washington D.C. 
HUD 6/4/2007 Alphonso Jackson, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, 
at the National Press Club; Promoting and Protecting 
Homeownership 
HUD 6/25/2007 Alphonso Jackson, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development at 
the FHA Regional Homeownership Summit Los Angeles, 
California 
 65 
HUD 7/10/2007 Secretary Alphonso Jackson Speaking 
Before the American Real Estate Society / Macau, China 
HUD 8/28/2007 Roy Bernardi, Deputy Secretary Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, Greenville, N.C. Making Homeownership a Reality 
Conference 
HUD 9/20/2007 Statement by Secretary Alphonso Jackson before the Committee on 
Financial Services United States House of Representatives 
HUD 10/5/2007 Alphonso Jackson, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, 
Federal Home Loan Bank of Dallas 
HUD 10/12/2007 Alphonso Jackson, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, 
at the Texas leadership summit for young professionals in Austin, 
TX 
 
HUD 10/16/2007 Alphonso Jackson Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, at 
the Mortgage Bankers Association 94th annual convention 
HUD 10/31/2007 Alphonso Jackson, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, 
Washington, D.C.  
HUD 11/15/2007 Alphonso Jackson, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, 
Detroit, M.I.; Homeownership Workshop 
HUD 11/28/2007 Alphonso Jackson, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, 
Washington, D.C.; International Housing Finance Policy 
Roundtable 
The U.S. Mortgage Market: Concerns and Prospects for 
International Investors 
Treasury 2/28/2006 Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions Emil Henry Prepared 
Remarks Credit Union National Association (CUNA) Government 
Affairs Conference 
Treasury 3/9/2006 Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Monetary and 
Financial Policy Mark Sobel U.S. Treasury Department 
Treasury 3/16/2006 Remarks of U.S. Treasurer Anna Escobedo Cabral Genworth 
Financial Luncheon 
Treasury 5/9/2006 The Honorable John W. Snow Prepared Remarks To The National 
Association of Home Builders Executive Meeting 
Treasury 3/15/2007 Testimony of Treasury Under Secretary Robert K. Steel Before the 
U.S. House Financial Services Committee on Government 
Sponsored Enterprise Reform 
Treasury 4/30/2007 Testimony of Dan Iannicola, Jr. Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Financial Education Before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on 
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and 
the D.C. 
Treasury 6/21/2007 Remarks by Anna Escobedo Cabral U.S. Treasurer U.S. Department 
of the Treasury Before the New Mexico Mortgage Lenders 
Association 
Treasury 9/5/2007 Testimony of Robert K. Steel Under Secretary for Domestic 
Finance U.S. Department of the Treasury Before the House 
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Committee on Financial Services 
Treasury 9/20/2007 Testimony of Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. Before the 
House Committee on Financial Services On the Legislative and 
Regulatory Options For Minimizing and Mitigating Mortgage 
Foreclosures 
Treasury 10/4/2007 Treasurer Anna Escobedo Cabral Remarks Before the Eastern 
Regional Conference on Reaching Unbanked People 
Treasury 10/10/2007 Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Announcement of 
New Private Sector Alliance – HOPE NOW 
Treasury 10/16/2007 Remarks by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Current Housing 
and Mortgage Market Developments Georgetown University Law 
Center 
Treasury 10/17/2007 David G. Nason, Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions 
Remarks on Financial Regulation Before the Exchequer Club 
Treasury 11/2/2007 Under Secretary Steel Testifies on Comprehensive Foreclosure 
Prevention Plan 
Treasury 11/19/2007 Under Secretary for Domestic Finance Robert K. Steel Remarks at 
Senator Norm Coleman’s Housing Townhall Forum 
Treasury 11/30/2007 Remarks of Treasurer Anna Escobedo Cabral on Working Together 
to Help Struggling Homeowners 
Treasury 12/11/2007 U.S. Treasury Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions David 
G. Nason Remarks before the City of London Corporation 
Redesigning U.S. Financial Regulation for a Global Marketplace 
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Appendix B. Description of LDA and text analysis procedures 
 
Practically speaking, topic-modeling algorithms identify words that consistently co-appear 
together as “topics” or themes. For the current analysis, I use Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), 
which is the simplest and most commonly used model in the topic models family (Blei 2012). In 
order to implement LDA, the researcher must have a collection of texts, usually called a corpus. 
The corpus must be separated into different “documents” because the model looks for words that 
consistently co-appear together within the separate documents. I use each public address as a 
separate document. Thus, the model looks for words that consistently co-appear together in 
different public addresses.  
The corpus, then, constitutes the observed data, i.e., words within documents, which the 
model uses to estimate the “distributions over words”—the set of topics in the corpus; and the 
“distributions over topics”—the topics that each document is “about.” The words in the corpus 
are assigned to different topics with varying probabilities. Words that have a high probability 
within a given topic are those words that are most likely to occur with the other words in that 
topic. A topic about the subprime crisis will have words like “mortgage” and “subprime” 
assigned to it with a high probability. In addition to identifying the topics that constitute the 
corpus, the model solution also indicates the topics that make up each document. These 
distributions indicate the proportion of words in each document that come from given topics. 
Thus, a document with 90% of its words from the worker benefit topic is mostly “about” worker 
benefits.   
More technically, the distribution over words (i.e., the topics in the corpus) and the 
distributions over topics (i.e. the topics within documents) are hidden random variables in a 
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hierarchical probabilistic model. LDA approximates the conditional distribution of those 
variables, given the observed data (Blei 2012). LDA does this by simultaneously working to 
meet two estimation goals: 1) allocating the observed words in each document to only a few 
topics and 2) establishing topics that have only a few words in them with a high probability. If 
the solution allocates only one topic to a document, meeting the first goal, then not all of the 
document’s words can occur in the topic with a high probability, thus violating the second goal. 
In order to meet the second goal, the words in the document must be assigned to several topics 
but the words cannot be allocated to very many topics without violating the first goal. This 
tension between these two estimation goals is key to LDA discovering useful topics (Blei 2012; 
DiMaggio, Nag, and Blei 2013). 
In the current analysis, I followed several common procedures for processing the text 
before running the topic models. I removed all numbers, punctuation, and “stop” words, which 
are commonly occurring words such as “the” and “and.”126  I also stemmed the words. This 
means that, for example, the words “mortgage” and “mortgages” would both be changed to the 
root term “mortgag.” I conservatively removed the most sparse terms, meaning terms that 
occurred 0 times in 99% of the documents (Griffiths and Steyvers 2004).  
Sometimes officials use the same speech on more than one occasion. I checked the 
documents for duplicates and identified nine sets of duplicates. I removed one of the duplicates 
from each set before running LDA then applied the appropriate topic assignments from the 
                                                
126 The full list of stop words that I removed is that compiled and made available by the 
University of Glasgow’s computer science department. The list can be seen here: 
http://ir.dcs.gla.ac.uk/resources/linguistic_utils/stop_words 
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remaining unique speech to the duplicates afterward. The final result of this processing for LDA 
was 3,848 unique terms distributed with various frequencies among 1,731 unique documents.  
The top ten terms from a select set of 17 topics are shown in Appendix B Table 1. The 
counseling and consumer credit topics are combined into one topic in Figure 1 in the main 
article. The Federal Reserve and the FDIC talked more about information disclosure from 
lenders while HUD and Treasury talked about mortgage counseling. Both policy approaches are 
focused on information, thus I combined them for the sake of simplicity. Similarly, the financial 
literacy and economic education topics are combined in Figure 2. The Federal Reserve, when 
discussing financial literacy used a different set of words than the other agencies did and thus the 
LDA solution returned two topics where a human coder might have returned one.  
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CHAPTER 3: STATES STEPPING IN: THE MEANING OF THE FORECLOSURE 
CRISIS AND STATES’ FORECLOSURE PREVENTION LAWS 
 
 
 
At the core of the 2008 economic crisis in the United States was a collapse in the housing 
markets (Blinder 2013; Eichengreen 2014; Shiller 2012). The rate of delinquencies on mortgages 
increased to eight times higher than the pre-crisis level; about fourteen million homeowners 
faced foreclosure proceedings; and ten million homeowners are still “underwater” on their 
mortgage (Martin and Niedt 2015). During this turmoil, the Federal Government helped a select 
set of borrowers and “encouraged” lenders to modify mortgages but stopped short of more 
aggressive policies, which many experts called for (e.g. Blinder 2008; Feldstein 2008). For its 
limited efforts, the Federal Government was accused on the one hand of not doing enough for 
homeowners and on the other hand of bailing out irresponsible borrowers. Some state 
governments, nevertheless, stepped into this political fray establishing strong mortgage 
assistance programs and mandating mortgage modifications. How did this policy effort at 
foreclosure prevention begin among the states and why were such efforts ultimately adopted by 
some states but not others? 
We might expect collapsing housing markets to motivate politicians to do something in 
their states, but understanding the specific policies enacted is not straightforward. Particularly 
when considering housing and spending policies in the U.S. context. The U.S. government, at all 
levels, has a complex relationship with the housing markets. Government support of the 
American dream of homeownership clashes, at times, with “laissez-faire sensibilities” in the U.S. 
(Quinn 2010: 4). Thus producing tensions between efforts that boost and protect homeownership 
and the great risk shift (Hacker 2006), in which individuals have limited social safety nets when 
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faced with life’s risks – including a housing market collapse (Dwyer and Lassus 2015). Indeed, 
housing policy scholars find that nations, like the U.S., with high rates of homeownership tend to 
be countries with weakly developed welfare policies (Kemeny 2005). This relationship, Kemeny 
(2005) and others (e.g. Castels 1998) argue, is the result of a privatization feedback loop: 
Governments support private homeownership through housing policies in which the fiscal cost is 
often obscured (Quinn 2010). Then, the high individual cost of homeownership contributes to a 
resistance to higher taxes to support more obvious spending policies. When a crisis-induced, 
deteriorating economy forces millions of homeowners out of their homes and results in the loss 
of the most valuable asset in their investment portfolios, it is not clear what the government’s 
role should be.  
Previous research suggests that understanding policy outcomes requires looking at 
political institutions and cultural factors, such as ideology. However, before policy-makers know 
how particular policies fit with ideological positions, policy-makers must first answer the 
question: what exactly is the problem? Gilardi, Shipan, and Wueest (2017) also argue that work 
on policy-making has ignored the critical stage of “issue-definition.” However, accurately 
conceptualizing and measuring the issue definition is a challenge. Gilardi, Shipan, and Wueest 
(2017) measure the framing of the policy itself, rather than the construction of the problem. How 
policies are framed is a fairly well examined area (e.g. Campbell 1998). The meaning of the 
recent foreclosure crisis, on the other hand, was not in inherent in the ambiguous, developing 
events themselves but rather is constructed as individual and organizational actors try to make 
sense of uncertain situations (Blyth 2002; Hay 1996; 1999; DiMaggio and Powell 1991). 
Whether social actors ultimately understand the problem of rising foreclosures as a “market 
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correction” or the result of “predatory lending,” will influence support of foreclosure prevention 
policies. Different constructions of the problem have vastly different implications for policy. 
This paper is among the small but growing number of studies that integrates two large 
literatures in social science – policy studies and culture (Berezin 2012; Skrentny 2006; 
Steensland 2006). I elaborate a theoretically meaningful cultural component – event or problem 
construction and test its influence on policy outcomes among U.S. states. I am able to 
quantitatively test this theory by advancing new computational techniques that are useful for 
systematically and inductively measuring and quantifying “culture” (DiMaggio, Nag, and Blei 
2013; Mohr and Bogdanov 2013). I use 12,682 newspaper articles from different states to 
measure the meaning of the foreclosure crisis in each state. 
States do not adopt policies in a vacuum, especially in the midst of a national economic 
crisis. Thus, the analysis also considers the influence between states (e.g. Soule and Zylan 1997; 
Vasseur 2014). Previous research suggests that, particularly in uncertain situations, social actors 
will learn from or mimic what others are doing (Hall 1993; DiMaggio and Powell 1991). 
However, social actors are generally not influenced by just anyone, they are influenced by those 
who are similar to them in meaningful ways. Although “cultural linkages” have been theorized 
as an important aspect of diffusion among social actors, this has proven difficult to test (e.g. 
Strang and Bradburn 2001). This is because of the difficulty of measuring and quantifying 
relevant cultural components. Previous research on diffusion of policies and practices among 
states tends to focus on what might be called objective factors of similarity between states; 
factors such as population level, the proportion of immigrants, and fiscal capacity, among others 
(e.g. Tolbert and Zucker 1983). Strang and Meyer (1993), however, theorize that “diffusing 
practices and adopter identities are rich in social and cultural meaning” and, thus, that diffusion 
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is most likely among social actors that are “culturally” similar with regard to the issue at hand 
(487). I test this by comparing states’ construction of the foreclosure crisis and estimating the 
extent to which a similar understanding of the crisis creates a cultural pathway for diffusion of 
foreclosure prevention policies among states.  
 
STATE ACTION DURING HOUSING MARKET CRISES 
 
Comparisons between the Great Depression and the Great Recession abound, not least in the 
similarities of the housing market distress experienced during both crises (e.g. Eichengreen 2014; 
Fishback, Rose, and Snowden 2013). In spite of the similarities of the housing market problems 
during the two crises, there were major differences in the policy response. At the federal level, 
for example, the policy response during the Great Depression was far more aggressive (Fishback, 
Rose, and Snowden 2013). In the 1930s, the Federal Government created and funded the Home 
Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC), which bought and refinanced distressed mortgages (Rose 
2011). The Federal Government also created the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) as well 
as the Federal Home Loan Bank system, among other new initiatives.  
 At the state level during the Great Depression, some states adopted foreclosure moratoria. 
Such a move was controversial at the time because, some argued, forced foreclosure moratoria 
would increase the cost of credit for future borrowers (Sloan 2008). Nevertheless, during the 
Great Depression, twenty-seven states ultimately enacted moratoria. In spite of similar warnings 
of negative side effects of government intervention in the housing markets during the Great 
Recession, thirteen states instituted similar stays on foreclosure proceedings and modification 
requirements. Seven additional states enacted spending policies to help current homeowners 
refinance or meet mortgage payment obligations. See table 1. 
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Table 1. States Passing Spending or Modification Foreclosure Prevention Policies 
      
State Type of 
Policy 
Date State Type of 
Policy 
Date 
Alabama - - Missouri - - 
Alaska - - Montana - - 
Arizona - - Nebraska - - 
Arkansas - - Nevada Modification July 2009 
California Modification July 2008 New Hamp. - - 
Colorado Modification June 2008 New Jersey Spending Dec. 2008 
Connecticut Spending Nov. 2007 New Mexico - - 
 Modification July 2008 New York - - 
Delaware Spending 2007 N. Carolina Spending  2007 
Florida - - N. Dakota - - 
Georgia Modification May 2008 Ohio - - 
Hawai’i - - Oklahoma - - 
Idaho - - Oregon - - 
Illinois Spending Feb. 2008 Pennsylvania Spending Oct. 2007 
Indiana - - Rhode Island - - 
Iowa Modification March 2009 S. Carolina - - 
Kansas - - S. Dakota - - 
Kentucky - - Tennessee - - 
Louisiana - - Texas - - 
Maine Modification June 2009 Utah - - 
Maryland Modification April 2008 Vermont - - 
Massachusetts Spending July 2007 Virginia Modification April 2008 
 Modification Nov. 2007 Washington Modification Oct. 2009 
Michigan Modification May 2009 W. Virginia - - 
Minnesota Modification June 2009 Wisconsin - - 
Mississippi - - Wyoming - - 
 
 
 
POLICY DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND EXPECTATIONS 
 
The housing market collapse began to unfold in 2006 when housing prices turned, starting a 
cascade of events. There was a drastic increase in mortgage payment delinquencies and 
foreclosures. By early 2007, mortgage lenders across the U.S. were filing for bankruptcy. By the 
summer of 2007, the Federal Government initiated its first policy response – FHASecure. 
Although the Federal Government would come to implement other programs designed to 
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stabilize the housing markets, none were particularly aggressive and all failed to be effective 
(Immergluck 2013).  
 Some state governments stepped in, taking relatively drastic action to try to address the 
housing market problems in their state. Many states passed considerably tougher regulations to 
try to circumvent such problems in the future. But some states went further and tried to prevent 
additional foreclosures on current homeowners. They did this either by establishing assistance 
programs that would help borrowers refinance into a better mortgage, or help borrowers make 
past due payments. Other states required modifications on current mortgages or the foreclosure 
process itself. It is these actions that are the focus of the current paper. States took these actions 
in the absence of similarly strong efforts by the Federal Government. Thus, these actions were 
innovations for the states and not simply explained by coercive forces from above (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983). 
 
Characteristics within states 
Economic factors alone have been found insufficient to explain policy outcomes 
(Skocpol 1995). However, they are important. In particular, a state’s fiscal capacity, that is the 
proportion of revenue not already committed, will impact its propensity to implement spending 
programs. The expectation here being that states with greater fiscal capacity will be more likely 
to implement foreclosure assistance policies, all else equal. States with limited fiscal capacity 
may nevertheless have been motivated to do something about foreclosures. Given that the main 
independent variable in this case is cultural meaning, it is important that no state is precluded by 
virtue of restrictions regarding balanced budgets, for example. Imposing mandatory 
modifications is another way for states to address foreclosures without the same budgetary 
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implications. However, mandatory modifications were controversial and therefore costly 
politically if not fiscally. States would not have implemented either type of policy lightly. Indeed 
spending and mandatory modifications were the types of housing policies that the Federal 
Government was most reluctant to implement (Immergluck 2013).  
Another relevant economic factor in this case is the health of the housing market in a 
given state and the extent of the housing market crisis there. Some states with relatively weak 
housing markets may have decided to take advantage of this national crisis to try to boost their 
housing markets. States like California and Florida that experienced a severe drop in housing 
prices, may also be more likely, all else equal, to try to prevent additional foreclosures from 
adding even more houses to the market, further exacerbating price declines.     
In addition to the economic conditions of states, relevant policy environments have been 
found in previous research to impact policy-making. Policy environments develop from 
experiences surrounding related preexisting policies. This is relevant in the current case because 
before the foreclosure crisis, 21 states had implemented relatively strong anti-predatory lending 
laws (Bostic et al. 2008). The states that perceived the need to protect constituents from 
predatory lending before the crisis may be more inclined to protect them from losses during the 
crisis. Further shaping this policy environment is the fact that the Federal Government preempted 
portions of these states’ laws (Bostic et al. 2998; Ding et al. 2011; Li and Ernst 2007). This 
political battle may have bolstered these states’ inclination to take action (Schneiberg 2007). 
However, critics of the path dependency of the policy environment literature point out 
that such a theory leaves little room for contingency or agency on the part of policy makers (e.g. 
Schneiberg 2007). The theoretical framework in the current paper, which incorporates the 
meaning making surrounding the foreclosure crisis, suggests where to look for the contingency 
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that may move policy making in the direction of paths not suggested by the foregoing policy 
environment. That is, states with anti-predatory lending laws could still construct the foreclosure 
crisis as a “necessary market correction,” thus not seeing government intervention as a useful 
effort. 
Another potentially important state characteristic is the racial make-up of states’ 
populations. There was a documented racial component in the expansion of mortgage credit 
during the housing boom—beginning the in the 1990s, there were dramatic increases in lending 
to low-income and minority households (Williams, Nesiba, and McConnell 2005). There was 
also a racial component in subprime lending and foreclosures (Martin and Niedt 2015). 
Researchers find that black and Hispanic neighborhoods have higher rates of subprime versus 
prime loans (Mayer and Pence 2008; Rugh and Massey 2010) and that these neighborhoods also 
experienced the brunt of the foreclosure wave (Rugh and Massey 2010). 
Previous research on whether or not social spending policies in general, such as 
unemployment insurance and welfare, are influenced by racial dynamics in the U.S. is mixed. 
Some scholars argue that the presence of racial minorities in the U.S. inhibited the development 
of strong welfare spending policies (e.g. Lieberman 1995). However, others argue that race 
cannot explain the pattern of social spending in the U.S. (e.g. Skocpol 1995). Most of these 
studies consider the impact of race on national policies. The smaller set of studies that focus on 
the state-level, tend to find that does race impact spending policies (Amenta and Poulsen 1996; 
Soule and Zylan 1997). However, these state-level studies examine policy changes in the early 
and mid-1900s. Thus, it may be that race would no longer negatively impact a state’s likelihood 
to implement foreclosure prevention policies in the 21st century. 
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In the current case, there are competing hypotheses. First, if policy-makers are 
disinclined to pass policies that are perceived to mainly benefit minorities, then one would 
expect that states with higher proportions of minority populations would be less likely to 
implement foreclosure prevention policies. Conversely, if states were aware of the 
disproportionate rates of subprime and predatory lending experienced by minorities, then one 
might expect policy-makers to be more inclined to assist those borrowers during the crisis. In this 
case, states with higher minority populations would be more likely to pass such legislation. 
The controlling political party in each state could also impact both foreclosure prevention 
spending policies and mortgage modification policies. With regard to the former, research 
finding political parties to be an important component when considering spending policies tends 
to be focused on European countries where labor or leftist parties may be dominant. In the U.S., 
scholars consider the Democratic Party to more closely resemble such parties and the Democrats 
are generally assumed to be more supportive of spending policies than the Republican party. 
However, within state governments, studies find that it is not quite as simple as “Democrats just 
taxing and spending more,” though controlling for other factors, Democrats do tend to spend 
more (Alt and Lowry 1994: 812).  
With regard to mortgage modifications, the Republican Party tends to favor “free-
market” policies, including for the financial industry. Thus, Republican-controlled state 
governments may be less inclined to pass non-voluntary modification policies. Yet, once again, 
what holds at the national level may not be so clear within the states. Especially in the complex 
realm of the mortgage markets where local consumer markets are intertwined with volatile 
global investment markets. State-level Republicans may be more inclined to protect constituents 
over global investors.  
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Policy studies predicting policy with the theoretical framework outlined above have been 
very productive (for a review see Amenta, Bonastia, and Carren 2001). However, Burstein 
(1991) and Campbell (2002) point out that such a framework is incomplete without considering 
the influence of cultural meaning. Two recent studies using comparative methodologies have 
shown the usefulness of incorporating cultural meaning. In one, Steensland (2006) shows that 
conceptions of “worth” influence welfare policies by constituting some people as “deserving.” 
Steensland makes an important observation in that which people are “worthy” depends, in part, 
on the meaning of unemployment. During President Kennedy’s administration, when 
unemployment came to be understood as “structural” unemployment, this shift in meaning 
created an opportunity for the re-classification of some people as worthy. Skrentny (2006) shows 
that policy-makers’ perceptions of the meaning of affirmative action social movements and the 
minority groups themselves influenced affirmative action policies.  
The meaning of the situations that policy-makers respond to are generally not inherent in 
the situations themselves. Indeed, there is considerable uncertainty involved in interpreting 
unfolding events and responding to them, especially economic crises (Blyth 2002; Hay 1996; 
1999). As the foreclosure crisis developed, individual and organizational actors constructed the 
meaning of these events, creating collective understandings of them. Some understood the 
“disruptions” in the housing markets to be “necessary market corrections” while others blamed 
foreclosures on “lending practices that are out there that are indefensible.” These different 
conceptions of the situation will have different impacts on states’ likelihood to engage in 
foreclosure prevention policies. If most state officials understood the foreclosure crisis to be 
rooted in the activities of speculative, irresponsible borrowers, they may be less inclined to help 
them. On the other hand, if officials consider their constituents to be the victims of predatory 
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lenders or caught up in financial market volatilities, they may be moved to try to mitigate 
borrowers’ losses.    
 
Inter-State Policy Diffusion  
 
While all of the above state-specific factors are important, state legislatures do not act in 
isolation, especially during a national crisis. Just as individuals in uncertain situations may look 
around them to see what others are doing, so state governments will look to other state 
governments. However, research has shown that actors generally do not look to just anyone, they 
look to nearby neighbors and otherwise similar others. Soule (1997), for example, finds that 
student activists adopted new protest tactics when students on other campuses that were similar 
to their own did. Haveman (1993) finds that firms will follow other firms that are similar and 
successful into new markets. As a final example, Soule and Zylan (1997) find that U.S. states 
will copy other similar states in passing welfare restrictions. 
For some time, researchers focused on direct relationships between actors as the paths of 
policy diffusion. Officials from state governments interact with each other directly via their 
membership in the Council of State Governments, for example. However, more recently scholars 
have made the case that indirect relationships based on socially meaningful similarities are an 
even stronger path of diffusion (Haveman 1993; Soule 1997; Soule and Zylan 1997; Strang and 
Meyer 1993). The difficulty is in identifying the relevant dimension of similarity. 
Identifying the relevant dimension is difficult but critical because states may see 
themselves as similar to specific sets of other states in one policy area but as similar to a wholly 
different set of states in another policy area. For example, California, New York, and Texas – 
among the states with the highest populations – may look to each other on urban development 
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issues but would be less likely to consider each other as models for environmental policies. 
Indeed, Strang and Meyer (1993: 491) argue that actors must understand each other as 
“fundamentally similar, at least with respect to the practice at issue.” In the current case, states 
that attribute similar meaning to the foreclosure crisis will be most likely to imitate each other on 
foreclosure prevention policies, even if they differ in other important ways such as the leading 
political party.  
There are two ways, then, in which the cultural meanings of the foreclosure crisis can 
influence states’ actions on foreclosure prevention. First, states’ own understanding of the 
situation will influence their policy responses. In addition, they can be influenced by other states 
that have similarly constructed this particular issue.   
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
I estimate the impact of both state-level factors and the influence of other states on a given 
state’s adoption rate using Strang and Tuma’s (1993) heterogeneous diffusion model: 
 
ℎ! ! = ℎ! t  exp !!!!  + !!!!"!∈! !  
 
where ℎ! t  represents the baseline hazard rate at time t, n specifies a focal state that has not 
passed foreclosure prevention legislation by time t, and S(t) represents the set of states that have 
passed foreclosure prevention legislation prior to time t. State-level covariates are entered into 
vector !!. In the second term, !!" equals 1 if state s is in state n’s reference group (what 
constitutes states’ references group is described below), otherwise !!" equals 0. Therefore, !! 
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captures the effect that the prior adoption of foreclosure prevention legislation by other similar 
states has on the focal state’s hazard of adoption. The heterogeneous diffusion model is an 
adaptation of the Cox proportional hazards model.  
 
Data and measures 
Foreclosure Prevention Policies. The National Governors Association (NGA) compiled a 
state-by-state list of actions taken on foreclosure prevention. Using this, I have identified states 
that have taken at least one of two types of policy actions (see Table 1 above). The first type is 
spending policies in which the funds assist current homeowners. This is distinct from policies 
that incentivize potential homeowners. An example of this type of policy is Connecticut’s “CT 
Families” refinancing program for subprime borrowers, in which Connecticut initially invested 
$50 million.1 The second type of policy considered is mandatory mortgage modification. This is 
distinct from policies that encourage modification but ultimately leave the decision to modify 
with the lenders. An example of a mandatory modification policy is California’s imposition of a 
90-day stay of foreclosure proceedings.2 States would not have implemented either type of policy 
lightly. Spending policies are almost always controversial and mandatory modifications were 
also controversial because they are government interference in markets.  
Measuring culture. While there has been rich theoretical development in the sociology of 
culture (Spillman 2002), previous empirical studies examining theoretical cultural concepts and 
policy have tended to be qualitative or small-N comparative (e.g. Steensland 2006; Skrentny 
                                                
1 For more information on this program, see the State of Connecticut’s webpage: 
http://www.ct.gov/dob/cwp/view.asp?a=2245&q=398720. 
2 For the text of California’s law see: http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/sen/sb_1101-
1150/sb_1137_bill_20080708_chaptered.html. 
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2006). A different methodological approach within cultural studies has emerged that takes 
advantage of “big data” sources, for example, the massive amount of text produced by 
newspapers, and uses computational approaches such as topic modeling (Bail 2014; DiMaggio, 
Nag, Blei 2013; Mohr and Bogdanov 2013; Monroe and Schrodt 2008). Topic models allow 
researchers to systematically and inductively code and quantify large amounts of text by using 
algorithms that iteratively sample from the body of text and identify groups of words that 
consistently co-appear together as “topics.” These models have successfully classified large 
bodies of academic articles, literature, and newspaper articles (Blei 2012; DiMaggio, Nag, Blei 
2013; Jockers and Mimno 2013).  
I collected newspaper article text for the current analysis using Lexis-Nexis academic. 
Karch (2007) argues that the agenda setting process is affected by newspaper coverage because 
coverage indicates to policymakers that a particular issue is important to voters. The ideal textual 
data for this study would be legislators discussing the housing market situation and debating 
legislative proposals to deal with it. However, in order to be included in the statistical analysis, 
these data would need to include all legislative discussions and debates across the entire analysis 
period for all fifty states, including those that did not result in enacted legislation. It would take a 
prohibitive amount of time to collect these data. I did collect legislative discussions and debates 
on enacted legislation and examined them to ensure that discussions reflected similar topics and 
therefore meanings of the foreclosure crisis as the topic modeling identified in the newspaper 
data. I share some of these data below.  
The examination of these legislative discussions also provided direct evidence that 
legislators are indeed influenced in their understanding of the problem by what they read in 
newspapers. For example, one Arizona House member who was advocating for forcing mortgage 
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companies to modify mortgages said: every economist talking about this problem that I have 
read about, says that our economy in Arizona will not recover until we curb our foreclosure rate.   
Thus, I searched for articles that had the words “foreclosure” or “foreclosures” in the 
headline of the article. I limited the articles to those that were published between 1/1/2007 and 
12/31/2009. Finally, I conducted this search repeatedly for each state using Lexis-Nexis’s tool 
for specifying geographical areas. This tool actually works by attributing a particular article to a 
given state if the state name appears in the article rather than attributing articles to states based 
on the publication source. I manually checked articles attributed to more than one state and 
assigned them to the correct state. For example, an article published by The Augusta Chronicle, 
one of Georgia’s newspapers, may mention that Georgia, Florida, and California’s foreclosure 
rates have increased. Lexis-Nexis would attribute this same article to all three states. I corrected 
these mis-attributions manually. 
To code and quantify these text data, I use Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), which is 
the simplest and most commonly used model in the topic models family (Blei 2012). In order to 
implement LDA, a researcher must have a collection of texts, usually called a corpus. The corpus 
must be separated into different “documents” because the model looks for words that 
consistently co-appear together within the separate documents. When executing LDA on a set of 
books, for example, researchers often separate the books into paragraphs that are then the 
“documents” (e.g. Jockers and Mimno 2013). When working with shorter texts, like newspaper 
articles (e.g. DiMaggio, Nag. Blei 2013), analysts often leave the original article as the separate 
documents. I follow this convention in the current analysis, using each newspaper article as a 
separate document. The model looks for words that consistently co-appear together in different 
articles.  
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The corpus, then, constitutes the observed data, i.e., words within documents, which the 
model uses to estimate the “distributions over words”—the whole set of topics in the corpus; and 
the “distributions over topics”—the topics that each document is “about.” The words in the 
corpus are assigned to different topics with varying probabilities. Words that have a high 
probability within a given topic are those words that are most likely to occur with the other 
words in that topic. A topic about the subprime crisis will have words like “mortgage” and 
“subprime” assigned to it with a high probability. While a topic about bankruptcy will have 
words like “law” and “bankruptcy” assigned to it with a high probability. In addition to 
identifying the topics that constitute the corpus, the model solution also indicates the topics that 
make up each document. These distributions indicate the proportion of words in each document 
that come from given topics. Thus, a document with 90% of its words from the bankruptcy court 
topic is 90% “about” bankruptcy court.   
More technically, the distribution over words (i.e., the topics in the corpus) and the 
distributions over topics (i.e. the topics constituting documents) are hidden random variables in a 
hierarchical probabilistic model. LDA approximates the conditional distribution of those 
variables, given the observed data (Blei 2012). LDA does this by simultaneously working to 
meet two estimation goals: 1) allocating the observed words in each document to only a few 
topics and 2) establishing topics that have only a few words in them with a high probability. If 
the solution allocates only one topic to a document, meeting the first goal, then not all of the 
document’s words can occur in the topic with a high probability, thus violating the second goal. 
In order to meet the second goal, the words in the document must be assigned to several topics 
but the words cannot be allocated to very many topics without violating the first goal. This 
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tension between these two estimation goals is key to LDA discovering useful topics (Blei 2012; 
DiMaggio, Nag, Blei 2013). 
I followed several common procedures for processing the text before running the topic 
models. I removed all numbers, punctuation, and “stop” words—commonly occurring words 
such as “the” and “and.”   I also stemmed the words. This means that, for example, the words 
“mortgage” and “mortgages” would both be changed to the root term “mortgag.” I removed the 
most sparse terms, meaning terms that occurred 0 times in 99% of the documents. This makes 
the computation more efficient without having any substantive effect on the results, as terms that 
do not appear in most of the documents are not consistently co-occurring with other terms 
(Griffiths and Steyvers 2004). After this processing, there were 2,066 unique terms distributed 
with various frequencies among the 12,682 documents.  
An important decision in specifying a topic model is how many topics the model should 
discover. Analysts should increase or decrease the number of topics specified in the model 
depending on whether they are looking for general topics or very fine-grained differentiations in 
topics.3 As the point of topic models is not to estimate true population parameters, there is not a 
“correct” number of topics that must be determined but rather a useful number that reveals 
interpretable topics (Blei 2012; DiMaggio, Nag, Blei 2013).  
I ultimately specified a model with 6 topics, after comparing results from models with 
topics varying from a minimum of 2 to a maximum of 25 topics. An important distinction for the 
current analysis is between discussions of the problem versus discussions of particular legislation 
already being considered. The latter is more about the framing of a policy while the argument in 
                                                
3 The author thanks David Mimno for explaining this point.  
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the current article is that the understanding of the problem itself will influence the type of 
solutions developed in response. Thus, I chose the LDA solution with the fewest number of 
topics that differentiated between the two types of discussions.  
Table 2. Top 30 terms in topics from 6-topic LDA model 
Topic 1  Topic 2 Topic 3 Topic 4  Topic 5 Topic 6 
Legislation  
 
Administrative Foreclosure 
data 
Foreclosure - 
crisis 
City 
development 
Foreclosure - 
market 
foreclosur properti file said said foreclosur 
said deed foreclosur foreclosur properti percent 
court counti percent mortgag citi said 
case record rate loan foreclosur year 
attorney said unit homeown year counti 
state secur hous help million sale 
law sale year peopl home home 
mortgag court month program sale number 
bank offic notic hous build state 
lender tax realtytrac payment owner rate 
file lien receiv lender foreclos month 
judg clerk auction year develop market 
homeown lot new borrow hous quarter 
requir mortgag report work market increas 
firm book bank home counti report 
loan date nation state neighborhood nation 
process attorney area make bank realtytrac 
legal parcel accord servic real accord 
servic subject default month valu properti 
general follow juli rate estat hous 
foreclos locat properti famili buyer area 
lawyer note increas credit tax file 
counti law april counsel buy mortgag 
settlement land home subprim work price 
action debt highest financi new drop 
new provid repossess time time averag 
claim notic ago feder sell declin 
mediat default citi problem say new 
say describ includ new auction lender 
offic sold paso modif just notic 
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The model with 6 topics resulted in separate problem and legislation topics and a topic that 
coherently represented discussions of residential foreclosures that find fault with lenders, express 
sympathy with borrowers, or discuss the necessity of generally assisting borrowers. (Table 2 
shows the top 30 terms from the 6 topics.) Topic 4, which I labeled “Foreclosures – Crisis,” 
reflects this type of discussion of foreclosures. For example, consider this quote from an article 
from a Massachusetts publication from July 2007 that was 77% about Topic 4: “People are 
losing their homes because of the lending practices that are out there that are indefensible.” An 
article that is 77% about a topic means that, most likely, 77% of the words in the article came 
from the words that constitute the topic.  
 For the analyses below, I first calculate the average monthly percent that a state’s articles 
were on the Foreclosures – Crisis topic. I do this because the observations are state-months. I 
then calculate a one-month lagged, seven-month rolling mean of the monthly average on that 
topic. I lag the measure because I assume that it takes some time for discussions of the problem 
to have an effect on legislation. I use a rolling mean because I assume that any effect of problem 
discussions would not immediately dissipate. Finally, I create a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the one-month lagged rolling mean is greater than thirty percent and 0 otherwise. I do this 
because the nature of LDA is such that each newspaper article is estimated to have some percent 
of its words from each topic, however minuscule that percent may be for some articles. A careful 
reading of several articles indicates that articles that are at least thirty percent about the 
Foreclosures – Crisis topic are recognizably about that topic. Thus I use thirty percent as a 
meaningful threshold. 
 In the examination of legislature debates, I looked for discussions that reflected (as with 
Topic 4 in the newspaper data) faulting lenders, sympathizing with borrowers, and discussing the 
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need to assist borrowers. The purpose of this examination is to confirm that legislators discussed 
the housing market problem in their state in similar ways as the states' newspapers did. For 
example, the Illinois legislature's debate over the spending bill they enacted in 2008 (see Table 
1) included the following excerpt:  It is the ARM [adjustable rate mortgage] that is under three 
years [adjusts to a different interest rate within the first three years of the repayment schedule] 
that has created the problem with predatory lending. ... Making fees and putting people in and 
out of products that are not suitable for the individual customer.  
  Economic condition. Following Soule and Zylan (1997), I use a measure of states’ fiscal 
balance. That is, revenue minus expenditures divided by revenue. This is a measure not just of 
states’ fiscal capacity but also takes into account how much spending states are already involved 
in. These data come from the 2007 – 2009 U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of State 
Government Finances. 
Housing Market Collapse. For this measure, I use the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s 
(FHFA) House Price Index. This index considers single-family house prices based on repeat 
sales or refinancings. As this is a standardized index rather than absolute house prices, the values 
are comparable across states. I calculate the change in the housing price index for a given state 
from the year prior.  
Policy environment. I use Bostic et al.’s (2008) designation of states with anti-predatory 
lending laws. These authors did a comprehensive assessment of states’ lending laws. They 
ranked the strength of the laws based the types of loans that were covered, the types of 
questionable practices that they restricted (for example balloon payments), and the strength of 
the enforcement mechanisms. Based on their systematic ranking, twenty-one states had average 
or above-average anti-predatory lending laws in place before the crisis.    
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Race. As a measure of the racial composition of states, I use the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
American Community Survey (ACS), 5-year average estimates of the proportion of white, black, 
and Hispanic populations in each state. 
Political Party Control in State Legislatures. I use data from the Council of State 
Governments’ Book of the States for the number of Republicans and Democrats making up each 
state legislature during each year from 2007 through 2009. I calculate the proportion of 
Republicans and Democrats in each chamber of states’ legislatures and create a dummy variable 
that is equal to 1 if the chamber is greater than fifty percent Republican and 0 otherwise. 
Diffusion measures. I include two diffusion measures in the following analysis. In one 
measure, I determine the number of prior states within geographic regions that have passed 
foreclosure prevention legislation. Previous research finds fairly consistent evidence of spatial 
dependence within geographical regions in legislation adoption (Maggetti and Gilardi, 2016). I 
use the seven geographic regions that the Bureau of Economic Analysis uses: New England, 
Mid-East, Great Lakes, Plains, South East, South West, and Far West. The second diffusion 
measure captures the number of other states that have passed foreclosure legislation that also 
similarly discussed the foreclosure crisis (i.e. states’ newspaper articles that are, on average, 
similarly either high (> 30%) or low (< 30%) on the Foreclosure – crisis topic). Table 3 shows 
descriptive statistics for all of these measures. 
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Table 3. Summary of State-month level economic, political, and demographic characteristics 
  
Percent with anti-predatory lawa 43% 
  
Percent Republican controlled 40% 
  
Mean fiscal balanceb -.21 
  
Mean percent race  
     Non-Hispanic black 10% 
     Latino 10% 
     Non-Hispanic other 7% 
     Non-Hispanic white 73% 
  
Mean number of prior laws  
     Region 1 
     Cultural group 6 
  
Percent state-months discussing problem 42% 
a Percent refers to the percent of state-months in the sample 
b fiscal balance = (total revenue – total expenditure) / total revenue  
 
RESULTS 
 
Before presenting results from the event history analysis, I show the relationship between the 
prevalence of the Foreclosure – crisis topic in states’ newspaper articles and passing foreclosure 
prevention legislation during the crisis in each state. In Figure 1, the dots show the rolling mean 
percent of an article in a given state on the Foreclosure – crisis topic across time (from July 2007 
to October 2009). The vertical line in some states indicates when they passed foreclosure 
legislation. The panels for the states in the figure are laid out in roughly geographical space and 
the dots are colored according to the geographical region each state is in. Nearly half (nine of 
twenty) of the foreclosure prevention measures were passed by New England or Mid-East states.  
This figure shows that there is variation across states in whether or not they refer to the 
developing foreclosure problems in the way reflected by the Foreclosure – crisis topic. There are 
several states, for example Arkansas and Delaware that never discuss the crisis in the terms of 
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the Foreclosure – crisis topic. In other states, for example North Carolina, over forty percent of 
each article (on a rolling mean basis) discusses events in the terms of the Foreclosure – crisis 
topic. Fourteen of the nineteen states that passed legislation experienced newspapers publishing 
articles constituted in large part by the Foreclosure – crisis topic.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Foreclosure–crisis topic across time by state and time that some states passed 
foreclosure prevention legislation. The dots indicate the seven-month rolling mean percent of the 
foreclosure-crisis topic constituting a state’s newspaper articles. The colors of the dots reflect the 
geographical region of the state. The vertical line in some states’ panel indicates the time when 
the given state passed foreclosure prevention legislation.  
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This is particularly intriguing in states such as Georgia and Pennsylvania with Republican-
controlled state legislatures who nevertheless passed aggressive foreclosure prevention policies. 
Also noteworthy is that states in the South-East region, a region in which few states passed 
foreclosure prevention legislation, the three states that did, had a relatively high percent of their 
articles constituted by the Foreclosure-crisis topic.  
 
Table 4.  Cox Proportional Hazards Model Estimates of the Passage of Foreclosure Prevention 
Legislation Among U.S. States, July 2007 to October 2009 
     
     
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Foreclosure – crisis (0 = less than 30%)   1.078* 1.075* 1.184* 
  (0.504) (0.499) (0.519) 
Anti-predatory law (0=no law) 0.295 0.0332 0.0399 0.211 
 (0.407) (0.354) (0.364) (0.500) 
Fiscal balance 0.666 1.000 1.007 1.014 
 (0.687) (0.720) (0.720) (0.594) 
Housing price index change -0.0301* -0.0266* -0.0268* -0.0254* 
 (0.0126) (0.0125) (0.0128) (0.0123) 
Republican controlled (0 = Democratic) -1.313* -1.411* -1.424* -1.557* 
 (0.587) (0.575) (0.576) (0.649) 
Race     
     Percent Black 0.884 1.243 1.249 2.266 
 (1.790) (1.704) (1.705) (2.080) 
     Percent Latino -1.172 -1.603 -1.727 -2.162 
 (2.328) (2.386) (2.643) (2.918) 
     Percent Other -2.250 -1.654 -1.779 -2.149 
 (1.844) (2.013) (1.999) (2.080) 
Number of prior laws in region   -0.0326 -0.164 
   (0.187) (0.273) 
Number of prior laws in cultural group    0.157 
    (0.116) 
     
State-months (N) 1,372 1,372 1,372 1,372 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 Results from the heterogeneous diffusion model in an event history framework are 
reported in Table 4. I use the Cox proportional hazards model to test the effect of the meaning of 
 94 
the foreclosure crisis on the policies developed in response, controlling for other important 
influences. The model compares states that adopt a foreclosure prevention policy with those that 
do not at different instances.  
Model 1 in Table 4 includes covariates identified in previous work to impact policy 
adoption. The policy environment as measured by tough anti-predatory lending laws before the 
foreclosure crisis does not significantly impact a state’s risk of adopting a foreclosure prevention 
policy. This is lack of an effect of the policy environment is contrary to previous work. In this 
case, it may be that this particular operationalization of the policy environment—anti-predatory 
lending laws—would be predictive of policies for tougher lending standards going forward, 
which many states did enact during the foreclosure crisis. However, tougher lending standards 
may not necessarily translate into rescuing borrowers who have already gotten themselves in 
trouble. This may be why there is not a significant effect for anti-predatory lending laws here. 
States’ fiscal balance also is not found to have a significant effect. The most likely reason for this 
finding is because the foreclosure prevention policies considered in this analysis include 
mandatory mortgage modifications, which do not require spending by the states. The racial 
composition of states’ population also does not have a significant effect. In Model 1, the trend of 
housing prices does have an effect. For each additional unit of increase in the housing price 
index from the year prior, the risk that the state legislature would pass foreclosure prevention 
legislation decreases by 3% (i.e. 1 - exp(-0.0301)). Particularly earlier on in the crisis, 
foreclosures rates in local areas could be skyrocketing even while more aggregate measures of 
housing market health—such as state-level housing prices—showed no signs of stress. The 
findings here suggest that policymakers wait to see effects in overall measures their states’ 
housing market health. Republican control of the legislature has a large effect on the risk of 
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passing foreclosure prevention legislation. A Republican controlled legislature is 73% less likely 
to pass such legislation.  
Model 2 adds the measure of the meaning of the foreclosure crisis, as discussed in states’ 
newspapers. These results suggest that in states where newspapers have discussed the foreclosure 
crisis as lenders’ fault or as borrowers needing help, the legislature is nearly 3 times (i.e. 
exp(1.078)) as likely to pass foreclosure prevention legislation. The overall health of the housing 
market in the state continues to have a small but significant effect in Model 2. Controlling for the 
meaning of the crisis, Republican controlled legislatures are even less likely than Democratic 
controlled ones to pass prevention legislation: 76% less likely now compared to 73% less likely 
from Model 1. 
Models 3 and 4 add in the diffusion measures. Model 3 adds in the measure of diffusion 
among states in the same geographical region. The point estimate actually suggests of negative 
effect, however it is not significant. This is contrary to previous research, which tends to find 
fairly consistent spatial diffusion effects. A reason for this contrary finding may be that much of 
the previous work examines diffusion over longer spans of time (e.g. Gray 1973). The 
mechanism of spatial diffusion is more dependent on interaction, which is less likely in a more 
constrained timeframe. It is also possible that the mechanisms by which policies diffuse during a 
crisis vary from those of normal policymaking. 
Model 4 adds in the measure of cultural diffusion. This measures the number of prior 
states whose newspaper articles similarly discussed the foreclosure crisis and that passed 
legislation. The results show that for each additional state within the cultural group that passes 
legislation, the risk of a focal state passing legislation increases by 17%, however this is not 
statistically significant.    
 96 
DISSCUSION  
This analysis provides a quantitative assessment of the impact of cultural meaning on policy-
making. The results show that cultural meaning affects policy adoption, even taking into 
consideration the extent of the housing market collapse and the partisan makeup of state 
legislatures.  
The financial market crisis peaked in 2008 but the housing market crisis continued to 
worsen into 2010. There are still pockets throughout the U.S. struggling to stabilize their housing 
markets. This paper contributes to understanding the policy responses to the foreclosure crises. 
This is important because the particular form of the recovery, which was shaped by the policy 
response, has exacerbated inequality in the U.S. (Mian and Sufi 2014; Piketty 2014). The policy 
response to the housing crisis warrants special attention for two reasons. First, many economists 
and officials, from all sides of the political spectrum, called for housing policies that would 
stabilize the housing markets, arguing that a recovery would be difficult without such policies 
(Blinder 2015).4 Second, the U.S. has a successful policy history in dealing with a housing 
collapse that comes from the Great Depression. During the Great Depression, aggressive efforts 
established organizations such as the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC), which research 
later determined helped stabilize not only homeowners but also banks (Eichengreen 2014). 
Nevertheless, the Federal government avoided implementing such policies during the recent 
crisis, as did some state legislatures. However, others states did pass aggressive foreclosure 
                                                
4 Liberal economist Alan Blinder and “deficit hawk” economist Martin Feldstein both called for 
a program similar to the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) that was implemented during 
the Great Depression. Glenn Hubbard, former Chairman of President George W. Bush’s Council 
of Economic Advisors, also called for government-funded mortgage modification. 
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prevention policies. Understanding this policy-making episode contributes to our theoretical 
knowledge of the political processes that led to such divergent policy outcomes.  
There are some limitations in the current article. Most significantly, newspaper article 
coverage of the crisis is not an ideal operationalization of the meaning of the foreclosure crisis 
among policymakers. Ideally, the data would include a measure of policymakers’ construction of 
the problem. Debates within state legislatures over enacted policies are available. However, the 
data would need to include all legislature debates within the analysis time period, not just those 
that result in passing legislation. Collecting this complete set of debate text data, across all fifty 
states, is prohibitively time-extensive. A second limitation in the current analysis is the 
construction of the cultural groups within which policy diffusion is tested. It may be that the 
relevant measure of cultural similarity is not simply the presence or absence of a particular 
problem construction but the presence of different constructions of the problem. Addressing this 
limitation is possible in future research and one approach is testing the effects of identifying 
cultural groups based on the prevalence of different topics on the foreclosure crisis.  
 This contributes to recent work that identifies subtle cultural processes that, ostensibly, 
are not meant to contribute to inequality, yet ultimately do have considerable consequences 
(Lamont, Beljean, Clair 2014). For example, Fourcade and Healy (2013) examine the effects of 
new credit scoring technologies that perpetuate disadvantage by connecting groups of people to 
higher interest rates and more exploitative loan structures. In the current case, the analysis shows 
that a construction of the foreclosure crisis as lenders’ fault or one in which borrowers should 
have help, affects whether state legislatures pass policies that prevent foreclosure. Foreclosures 
wipe out households’ net worth. In the recent crisis, certain neighborhoods and borrowers faced 
disproportionate rates of foreclosure (Rugh and Massey 2010). 
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CHAPTER 4. WEALTH AND INEQUALITY IN THE STABILITY OF ROMANTIC 
RELATIONSHIPS	
	
The “Great Recession” of 2008-2009 raised public awareness about inequality in American 
society and invigorated a host of scholarly activity into the causes and consequences of extreme 
and rising wealth inequality (Piketty 2014; Pfeffer, Danziger, and Schoeni 2013). The family is a 
key institution that transmits inequality across generations, and racial and socioeconomic 
inequalities in family life have grown markedly over the past half-century (McLanahan 2004; 
Pfeffer and Schoeni, this issue). Most research has examined how family processes reproduce 
income inequality (Western et al. 2012), but wealth may influence the formation and stability of 
family relationships in distinct ways (Keister 2000: 6-16, 225-229). In this paper, we use 
longitudinal data from the 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008 panels of the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation (SIPP) to offer a comprehensive account of how wealth relates to family 
stability and how that association varies by relationship type, age cohort, and type and amount of 
wealth. We also examine both the material and symbolic significance of wealth for relationship 
stability.  We conclude by considering whether wealth inequalities contribute to population-level 
inequalities in family stability by race and by macroeconomic context. 	
 
BACKGROUND	
Inequalities in Family Formation and Family Stability	
 Family structure and family stability are profoundly unequal along the lines of race and 
class (McLanahan and Percheski 2008; Ellwood and Jencks 2004; Kennedy and Bumpass 2008). 
These inequalities have grown substantially over the past half-century, contributing to what 
McLanahan (2004) and others have called the “diverging destinies” of children.  There was little 
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socioeconomic gradient in marriage or childbearing in the 1960s, but today most children of 
college-educated parents grow up in households characterized by stable married families and 
stable finances, whereas the children of less-educated parents are increasingly exposed to 
unstable family and economic situations. Socioeconomically disadvantaged adults are less likely 
to form marital relationships, more likely to have children outside of marriage, and have less 
stable relationships than their more advantaged counterparts (McLanahan 2004; Ventura and 
Bachrach 2000). As a result, the children of married parents spend the vast majority of their 
childhoods with both parents (84 percent), while the children of unmarried parents can expect to 
spend just about half (52 percent) of their childhood with both parents (Bumpass and Lu 2000). 
These patterns also fuel racial inequality in family life, with African American couples 
significantly less likely to marry or to have stable romantic relationships, and more likely to have 
children outside of marriage, relative to whites; patterns for Latino families are more variable 
(Kennedy and Bumpass 2008; McLanahan and Percheski 2008).	
 The growing educational and racial gradients in family formation and stability are 
particularly consequential because they overlap with a period of growing income and wealth 
inequality. Part of changing dynamics in income inequality comes from rising incomes for those 
in the top decile of the income distribution. Saez (2009) calculated that from the 1940s until the 
early 1980s, the top decile accounted for just over a third of total income in the US. However, 
from the early 1980s forward, the percent of income going to the top 10 percent rose such that by 
2007, they accounted for fully half of total income. Wealth inequality has also been driven by the 
top of the distribution pulling away from the rest:  the top 0.1 percent owned a staggering 22 
percent of total wealth in 2012 (Saez and Zucman 2014).  This growth at the top of the income 
and wealth distributions was accompanied by stagnation and even decline among the lower 
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quintiles. These trends were exacerbated by the 2008 recession, when median wealth plummeted 
and wealth inequality increased sharply (Wolff, this issue).1  
 Socioeconomic status structures the formation, progression, and dissolution of romantic 
relationships. Much of the work on family dynamics and economic inequality has focused on 
education- or income-based measures of inequality (see McLanahan and Percheski 2008 for a 
review). We argue that wealth is an important but understudied dimension of family 
relationships. Wealth is not simply a function of income or education (Hurst et al. 1998; Keister 
2000). First, wealth is a stock rather than a flow. It is transmitted across generations in very 
tangible and unequal ways. It buys access to elite social settings like neighborhoods, schools, and 
colleges (Keister 2000; Oliver and Shapiro 1995; Rauscher, this issue). It also allows families to 
insure against economic risks in other domains of life, and may serve as a buffer against adverse 
effects of income volatility on consumption (Fisher et al, this issue). Further, income and wealth 
are not highly correlated. Although those with long-term, low income may begin to look like 
those with low wealth, this is not necessarily the case. The very wealthy may have low earnings 
and support consumption with income from assets (Wolff 1995) and at all income levels, there 
are large differences in saving and investment (Brimmer 1988). As a result of these important 
distinctions, wealth may shape the progression and stability of family relationships in distinct 
and consequential ways.  
Wealth and the Progression of Romantic Relationships 	
 The institution of marriage is held in high esteem by Americans of all races and classes 
(Axinn and Thornton 2000; Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001), and it is increasingly viewed 
                                                
1 There is some debate about exactly how much inequality in income (Armour, Burkhauser, and 
Larrimore 2014) and in wealth (Bricker et al. 2015) has increased.  
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as a coveted social status, or capstone, in the life course (Cherlin 2004). Today, most Americans 
believe that they should have not just steady employment but also some assets – money saved, a 
car, or even a home—before they marry (Dew and Price 2011; Edin and Kefalas 2005; Gibson-
Davis et al. 2005, 2009; Lloyd and South 1996). These prerequisites for marriage—the “marriage 
bar”—are held by rich and poor alike, but the poor are significantly less likely to be able to 
realize them (Gibson-Davis et al. 2005). Researchers have used the idea of the marriage bar to 
explain racial and socioeconomic gaps in entry into marriage. Although wealth figures strongly 
in qualitative narratives of the marriage bar (Edin and Kefalas 2005), only a handful of studies 
have examined wealth as an independent component of the marriage bar. These studies find that 
wealth, particularly homeownership, increases the likelihood of marriage (Lloyd and South 
1996; Gibson-Davis 2009), and that racial inequalities in wealth explain a significant part of the 
racial gap in the decision to marry (Schneider 2011). 	
 Schneider (2011) argued that wealth may influence the decision to marry because of its 
symbolic value or its use value. Wealth has use value because it can be deployed to boost 
material wellbeing by mitigating material hardship and insuring against future economic 
uncertainty (Fisher, this issue; Oppenheimer, Kalmijn, and Lim 1997). The symbolic value of 
wealth inheres in what wealth signifies to others (Lamont and Molnar 2002; Cherlin 2004). To 
the extent that marriage has become a status marker, displays of wealth – a big wedding, 
purchasing a house – signal that the couple has achieved the requisite social status deemed 
worthy of marriage (Veblen 1973; Zelizer 1997; Cherlin 2004). The decision to hold assets 
jointly or solely may also hold symbolic meaning within the relationship as a signal of couples’ 
commitment, independence, or expectations about the future stability of their relationship (Addo 
and Sassler 2010; Kenney 2004; Treas 1993).  	
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 Compared to the accumulation of research on wealth and marriage entry, we know less 
about how wealth influences the stability of marriages. The family stress model predicts that 
economic hardships lead to feelings of economic pressure, which undermine interpersonal 
interactions and emotions within marriages, resulting in increased marital conflict (Conger and 
Elder 1994; Conger et al 1990; Gudmunson et al. 2007). Marital conflict, in turn, is a key 
predictor of divorce (Amato and Rogers 1997). Economic hardship has been conceptualized in a 
number of ways--including income, poverty, and indicators of specific hardship experiences like 
food or housing insecurity--and the associations with marital distress are robust to the specific 
indicator of hardship that is used (Conger et al. 2010).  	
 Although wealth is moderately correlated with other indicators of socioeconomic status, 
it is not reducible to them, and scholars have only recently begun to untangle the unique effects 
of asset and debt accumulation on marital satisfaction and divorce (Dew 2011). Liquid assets 
(which can be converted to cash relatively easily) and illiquid assets (houses, cars, property) 
could promote marital stability because couples can draw on these assets to buffer against 
transitory shocks to income, which could reduce the marital strain that tends to accompany 
economic shocks. There may also be symbolic benefits to asset holdings as well: financial assets 
are associated with a positive future orientation, enhanced personal efficacy, and greater social 
participation (Sherraden 1991; Yadama and Sherraden 1996), which could have positive 
repercussions for interpersonal interactions and commitment within romantic relationships. Joint 
ownership of assets might signal particularly committed relationships (Addo and Sassler 2010; 
Treas 1993). Additionally, significant asset holdings might deter divorce because of the 
transaction costs associated with adjudicating the division of assets in divorce proceedings. 	
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 In contrast, predictions about how debt might influence marital stability are less clear. 
According to life cycle theories of debt, secured debts, like mortgages or educational loans are 
investments that individuals (or couples) make in order to boost their long-term economic 
wellbeing.2 In the long-term, the financial benefits are expected to outweigh the short-term 
financial costs (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954). Such debts may have little short-term influence 
on relationships, and may ultimately promote marital quality and stability in the long term. There 
may also be a life cycle component to the meaning of secured debts, with greater secured debt at 
young ages being less troubling than it is at older ages.  
 Unsecured debts, like consumer or credit card debt, also have ambiguous associations 
with relationship stability. They may be used to smooth consumption, thus averting financial 
hardships, and preserving relationship quality and stability. But they may also signal financial 
hardship or even cause financial hardship directly by diverting household income to debt 
repayment. Consistent with this latter hypothesis, consumer debt is associated with feelings of 
anxiety, economic pressure, and marital conflict (Conger et al. 1994; Dew 2005; Drentea 2000).  	
 Variation by Union Type. Virtually all of the prior literature focuses on how wealth 
shapes decisions to start or end a marriage. Given the retreat from marriage and the concomitant 
growth of cohabitation over the past half century (Lundberg and Pollack 2013), it is important to 
understand whether economic forces influence the stability of cohabiting unions in the same way 
they influence the stability of marriages. There are competing hypotheses. On one hand, ending a 
                                                
2 During the recent housing boom, this relationship between secured debt and long-term 
economic wellbeing may have been more tenuous as homeowners increasingly cashed in home 
equity to finance consumption. We thank a reviewer for pointing this out. This became more 
prevalent beginning in 1999 (Brown et al. 2010). We confirm that relationships between secured 
debt and the likelihood of relationship dissolution are not significantly different for respondents 
in the 1996 and 2008 SIPP panels.   
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marriage has greater symbolic and financial costs than ending a cohabiting union. Divorce is a 
legal procedure that requires retaining a lawyer and undergoing court-mediated division of assets 
and belongings, which can be a lengthy, costly, and emotionally painful process. Divorce also 
has symbolic costs, as partners lose their place in a legally recognized kinship system and the 
support that it provides. Thus, one might predict that married couples will be less likely to end 
their relationships in the face of low or declining levels of wealth than cohabiting couples, net of 
other economic characteristics.  	
 On the other hand, given the “marriage bar” standards described above, married couples 
might be more responsive to wealth when deciding to end relationships than cohabiting couples. 
If marriage is a coveted social status that signifies that a couple has “made it” financially, 
perhaps married couples will be more likely to break up relative to cohabiting couples when 
adverse economic conditions cause them to fall below the “marriage bar.” In fact, qualitative 
researchers have found that couples do not hold the same standards for their cohabiting 
relationships as they do for marital relationships, and they tolerate adverse economic and 
interpersonal conditions in cohabitation that they say they would not tolerate within marriage 
(Edin and Kefalas 2005). Indeed, research examining the relative importance of economic 
conditions across union types has found that socioeconomic factors are more important 
predictors of relationship stability for marital unions than for cohabiting unions (Tach and Edin 
2010).	
 Racial Inequality. There are large racial differences in the formation and stability of 
marital relationships. African American couples are less likely to enter marriage and have less 
stable marriages than white couples, even taking into account differences in economic 
characteristics such as income and employment (Kennedy and Bumpass 2008; McLanahan and 
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Percheski 2008). Since racial inequalities in wealth are stark (Oliver and Shapiro 1995; Conley 
1999; Bucks, Kennickell, and Moore 2006; Killewald and Bryan, this issue), if wealth shapes the 
progression of romantic relationships via the mechanisms identified above – serving a use value 
by buffering financial hardships and/or serving a symbolic value by signaling the achievement 
and maintenance of the “marriage bar” – racial wealth gaps might explain some of the racial 
inequality in the stability of family relationships. Schneider (2011) found that including 
measures of wealth as use value and symbolic value in models of first marriage reduced the 
black-white gap in marriage by about 30 percent, which was more than conventional economic 
covariates like employment and income explained. We know less about whether differences in 
wealth can help to explain racial gaps in the stability of romantic relationships after they form. 	
Macroeconomic Contexts and Relationship Instability	
 Macroeconomic downturns--characterized by some combination of high unemployment 
rates, stock market volatility, falling GDP, and declining housing values--have the potential to 
shape the economic wellbeing of large segments of the population, with cascading effects on 
family dynamics. Under normal macroeconomic conditions, we might expect family-level 
economic hardship to reduce family stability by heightening economic strain, reducing marital 
quality, and thereby increasing divorce rates via the mechanisms we delineated above. But the 
effects of family-level economic hardship may be different during macroeconomic downturns, 
when many others are experiencing hardship as well. In particular, it may be more costly for 
couples to dissolve their unions when the economy is struggling (Light and Kuisto 2015; 
Modestino and Dennett 2013). Couples may face greater constraint in their housing and 
employment options. They may lack the financial wherewithal set up two different households or 
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to cover the cost of a divorce proceeding. Couples may also find it more difficult to divide up 
certain assets, such as homes or stock market holdings, if the value of those assets declined. 	
 These forces may be one reason why researchers have found mixed effects of 
macroeconomic conditions on divorce rates (Cherlin et al. 2013; Chowdhury 2013; Harknett and 
Schneider 2012). Divorce rates dropped during the Great Depression (Cherlin et al. 2013), but 
recessionary periods post-World War II were associated with greater divorce risk (South 1985). 
Recent estimates from work on the “Great Recession” that began in 2008 found that rising 
unemployment rates were associated with reductions in the divorce rate (Amato and Beattie 
2010; Hellerstein and Morrill 2011; Schaller 2013; Harknett & Schneider 2012; Cherlin et al. 
2013; but see Arkes and Shen 2014). However, there is mixed evidence from the Great 
Recession on the effect of foreclosure rates – another indicator of macroeconomic conditions – 
and marital stability. Harknett and Schneider (2012) found that higher foreclosure rates reduced 
divorce rates, but Cohen (2014) found that higher foreclosure rates increased divorce rates. 	
 To our knowledge, research on the macroeconomic contexts of relationship stability has 
focused exclusively on marital stability. Even though the empirical record on marital stability is 
mixed, we predict that recessions might boost the stability of cohabiting unions, in part because 
there are financial benefits of pooling incomes that may be particularly necessary during periods 
of macroeconomic hardship. Individuals are more likely to ‘double up’ (i.e. share living 
arrangements) during recessionary times (Mykyta and Macartney 2011; Bitler and Hoynes 2015; 
Cherlin et al. 2013), and cohabitation is one form of doubling up as many cohabiting couples cite 
economic reasons for moving in together (Sassler 2004). 	
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THE PRESENT STUDY	
Our study offers a comprehensive portrait of how wealth relates to family stability.  We build on 
a small but growing body of research in this area by examining how distinct forms of wealth and 
debt shape relationship stability. First, we disaggregate wealth into distinct components--liquid 
and illiquid assets, secured and unsecured debt. We expect that assets of all kinds will be 
associated with an increase in relationship stability, unsecured debt will be associated with a 
reduction in relationship stability, and secured debt will have no effect on relationship stability, 
at least in the short term.  Second, we consider heterogeneity in the wealth-relationship 
association. In line with the marriage bar hypothesis identified in prior research, we expect that 
wealth will be less associated with the continuance or ending of a union for cohabiting couples 
than for married couples; we therefore predict stronger wealth-stability associations for married 
couples than for cohabiting couples. We also expect the associations between wealth and 
relationship stability to be stronger for older couples than for younger couples, in line with life 
cycle theories of debt.  
 Second, we explore the practical and symbolic meanings of wealth for relationship 
stability.  Following Schneider (2011), we construct measures of the symbolic and use value of 
assets and assess their associations with relationship stability.  We also examine whether the 
joint versus sole ownership of assets is related to relationship stability, as prior work has found 
that joint ownership is associated with greater commitment and higher reported relationship 
quality.  
 Finally, we examine whether wealth inequality contributes to population-level 
inequalities in relationship stability. We focus on two policy-relevant inequalities in this paper: 
race and macroeconomic conditions. We expect that wealth inequality will explain a significant 
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portion of the racial gap in relationship stability, net of the standard economic variables of 
income and education that family researchers typically use to measure socioeconomic status. We 
also expect that wealth will be a significantly weaker explanation for couples’ relationship 
stability during periods of economic recession than during normal economic times, consistent 
with the hypothesis that it is harder to dissolve unions during periods of macroeconomic 
hardship.  
	
DATA AND METHOD	
We use data from multiple panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), 
starting with the 1996 panel and ending with the 2008 panel, which concludes in 2013. The SIPP 
is a nationally representative survey designed to provide comprehensive information about the 
sources of income and government program participation of individuals and households in the 
United States on a sub-annual basis. The survey is designed as a series of national panels, each 
lasting three to four years. Together, the panels provide almost-continuous coverage of the U.S. 
household population since 1996. Unlike other longitudinal surveys, each panel draws a new 
nationally representative sample, rather than focusing on a single cohort (for which age and 
period effects are confounded).	
In each SIPP panel, every member of the household aged 15 or older was interviewed 
every four months and asked about the previous four months. All household members aged 15 
and older were interviewed directly if possible or by proxy response from another household 
member otherwise. The SIPP imputes item—and person—nonresponse in all waves (Westat 
2001: chapter 4). A household roster indicates the relationship of each household member to the 
household head and monthly changes in the household roster are assessed at each survey. The 
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SIPP follows all original sample members (who are present at the first survey wave) regardless 
of where they move in subsequent survey waves (unless they are institutionalized, in military 
barracks, or abroad). The SIPP also surveys new individuals who live in households with original 
sample members over the course of the panel; these new individuals are not followed after they 
stop living with an original sample member. The SIPP also includes topical modules that are a 
separate set of questions, asked in addition to the regular core survey questions, during two or 
three waves of each panel. One set of topical modules asks detailed questions about asset and 
debt types and values, which we use for this analysis.3 	
In this article, we construct an analytic subsample of families by identifying the 
household reference person, who we follow until the survey ends. By following just the reference 
person, we avoid having both parties to a single union in the data. We restrict the sample to 
working-age adults, eighteen to sixty-four years old. We further restrict the sample to opposite-
sex couples, as there were too few same-sex couples reported, especially in earlier panels, for 
separate analyses. This results in a sample of 1,555,352 married family observations (61,479 
distinct relationships) and 172,034 cohabiting family observations (6,037 distinct relationships) 
across all four panels of the SIPP. We observe about 6 percent of married couples, and 21 
percent of cohabiting couples, ending their unions during the SIPP panels. 	
Measures	
Family Structure and Dissolution. In each month of the SIPP, we assess family structure 
by identifying adults living in the same household and classifying them as (a) household head, 
                                                
3 The assets and debt topical modules were asked in the following waves: 3, 6, 9, and 12 for the 
1996 panel; 3, 6, and 9 for the 2001 panel; 3 and 6 for the 2004 panel; and waves 4, 7, and 10 for 
the 2008 panel. 	
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(b) spouse of the household head, or (c) unmarried partner of the household head.  Households 
are coded as “married” if a spouse of the household head is listed on the household roster, or 
“cohabiting” if an unmarried partner of the household head is listed on the roster. In all of the 
SIPP panels used in this paper, participants were asked directly about the presence of an 
unmarried partner. We identify a marital dissolution as occurring in the month in which the 
household reference person’s family structure changes from married to any other household type 
and either a separation or a legal divorce occurred. We identify cohabitation dissolution as 
occurring in the month in which one of the cohabiting partners no longer lives in the household.  
There are no direct questions about the start and end dates of nonmarital romantic relationships 
in these panels of the SIPP, so we must measure the start and end of cohabitations based on the 
household roster rather than direct questions about relationship status. 	
Family Wealth and Debt Components. We create four measures of wealth that mirror 
Czajka, Jacobson, and Cody’s (2003) measures using SIPP (see appendix A for a detailed list of 
the SIPP variables comprising each measure). First, we calculate the value of all secured debt. 
For most participants this is largely constituted by their mortgage. Some have business debts that 
are secured by the value of the business. Second, we calculate the value of unsecured debt. This 
is constituted largely by store and credit card debt. Third, we calculate liquid assets, which 
includes saving and checking account balances. Fourth, we calculate illiquid assets, which 
include the values of participants’ car(s) and the value of their house or business.4 Information is 
collected on assets and debts held individually by each adult in the household, as well as some 
                                                
4 The SIPP does not have reliable data on life insurance, defined contribution pensions, annuities 
or trusts and thus underestimates assets. However, given the SIPP’s complement of other data, it 
is still an ideal dataset for the current paper (Czajka, Jacobson, and Cody 2003). 
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assets and debts jointly held by spouses. We add individual and jointly held assets and debts 
together for each person in the union to create family-level measures. The dollar value of these 
measures is adjusted to 2013 dollars using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics inflation 
calculator. Table 1, on the following page, shows the mean and median values of each measure 
of wealth by union type and stability. We construct standard deviation measures of each of the 
asset and debt measures for inclusion in the regression models, so that our coefficients represent 
how a standard deviation change in assets or debts influences relationship stability.  
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Table 1. Demographic and Economic Characteristics of Married and Cohabiting Couples in the 1996 – 
2008 Panels of the SIPP. 
  Married Cohabiting 
 Full Sample No Dissolution Dissolution No Dissolution Dissolution 
Mean Assets/Debt      
     Secured Debt $101,000 $106,000 $73,000 $57,000 $43,000 
     Unsec. Debt $12,000 $12,000 $11,000 $9,300 $11,000 
     Liquid Assets $114,000 $122,000 $51,000 $40,000 $30,000 
     Illiquid Assets $268,000 $282,000 $175,000 $138,000 $107,000 
Median Assets/Debt      
     Secured Debt $63,000 $70,000 $20,000 $0 $0 
     Unsec. Debt $1,700 $1,800 $1,900 $600 $1,400 
     Liquid Assets $20,000 $24,000 $3,800 $1,700 $1,000 
     Illiquid Assets $180,000 $191,000 $100,000 $4,400 $17,000 
Monthly Income $7,300 $7,500 $5,800 $5,500 $4,900 
Age  44 45 41 39 37 
Relationship Type      
     Percent Cohabiting  7 - - 84 16 
     Percent Married  93 97 3 - - 
Employed      
     Percent Female 37 36 44 44 45 
     Percent Male 63 64 56 56 55 
Households with Children 55 56 60 40 40 
Race/Ethnicity      
     Percent Black 7 7 10 11 12 
     Percent Latino 13 12 16 18 13 
     Percent Other 6 6 5 4 4 
     Percent White  74 75 68 67 71 
Education      
     Percent Less than HS 10 9 13 16 14 
     Percent High School 25 25 29 30 32 
     Percent Some College 33 33 37 36 38 
     Percent Four Years  32 34 21 18 16 
N of Relationships 76,092 62,242 5,218 6,313 2,319 
Relationship-months 1,738,432 1,550,577 63,009 103,539 21,307 
Source: Authors’ tabulations using SIPP data. Note: statistics weighted using national sampling weights.  
Monetary values reported in 2013 dollars. 
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Race and Ethnicity. The SIPP asks directly about the race and ethnic origin of 
participants. We use the race and ethnicity of the reference person as our measure. We maintain 
four categories: non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, Hispanic, and non-Hispanic other 
race. Table 1 shows the proportion of the sample in each racial/ethnic category, as well as the 
share of each group who experience a marital separation (given that they were married) or a 
cohabiting union dissolution (given that they were in a cohabiting union). Appendix table B 
shows differences in mean and median wealth and debt accumulation among racial/ethnic 
groups.	
Education. The SIPP asks about years of education completed for the reference person, 
which we recode into a four-category measure: less than high school (less than twelve years of 
school), high school (twelve years of school), some college (thirteen to fifteen years of school), 
and four-year degree or higher (sixteen years of school or more). Table 1 shows the proportion 
of household heads with each level of education, as well as the percentages from each 
educational category who experience a marital separation (given that they were married) or a 
cohabiting union dissolution (given that they were in a cohabiting union).  	
Macroeconomic Conditions. We measure macroeconomic conditions in two ways. First 
we include a measure of state-level unemployment. We use monthly unemployment rates from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) series at the 
state level. These unemployment data were merged with the SIPP data by month-year and the 
reference person’s geographic location.5 Amato and Beattie (2011) find that unemployment tends 
                                                
5 For the 1996 and 2001 panels, there are two geographic areas that combine two sets of states. 
Those living in North Dakota and South Dakota were coded the same. As were those living in 
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have the strongest effect when considering unemployment rates within the year or with a year 
lag. However, unemployment rates rose fairly quickly during the Great Recession’s fallout, thus, 
following Harknett and Schneider (2012), who analyzed a similar time period, we separate the 
unemployment rates into quartiles and lag the quartiles by three months. As a second measure of 
the macro-economic conditions we include a measure of national-level recession using the 
National Bureau of Economic Research’s (NBER) US Business Cycle Expansions and 
Contractions data. Out time period of analysis includes the 2001 recession, which lasted from 
March 2001 until November 2001, as well as the Great Recession, which lasted from December 
2007 until June 2009. We merge these data with our SIPP sample by month-year.	
Additional Time-Varying Controls. Total monthly family income is measured in each 
month by calculating the sum of the SIPP-generated total person income measures for the 
reference person and his/her spouse or partner. Age is included as the reference person’s age in 
years. We include a dummy variable indicating whether or not the reference person has children 
living in the household. We also include dummy variables for employment that indicates whether 
or not the male partner is employed and whether or not the female partner is employed. In some 
analyses, we include a dummy variable indicator for whether the couple experienced an income 
shock, measured as having experienced a reduction in income in the previous month from the 
month before or not. We also include a measure of material hardship in some analyses. For this 
measure, we used a SIPP topical module question asked once in the 1996, 2001, and 2004 panels 
                                                                                                                                                       
Vermont and Maine. We averaged the unemployment data for these sets of states and applied the 
average to respondents living in these areas. 
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and twice in the 2008 panel6, which asks respondents whether they had difficulty meeting any of 
their essential household expenses, such as mortgage or rent payment, utilities bills, or medical 
expenses at any time in the past twelve months. We created a dummy variable for whether 
respondents experienced hardship and applied that variable to the past twelve months of 
observations for each respondent.	
Method	
Our analyses are based on event history models of time to union dissolution. We use Cox 
proportional hazards models to estimate the risk of “failure,” or dissolution, as a function of 
wealth, debt, and other family characteristics. Respondents who enter the survey period already 
in a marriage or cohabiting relationship are immediately in the risk set. Respondents who enter 
unions later during a SIPP panel enter the risk set the first time the union is reported in the 
survey. We measure time duration as months since union entry (or since the survey began for 
those already in a union), with participants censored at the end of the survey period. We allow 
respondents to contribute multiple dissolutions and adjust for multiple relationships with robust 
standard errors. Thus, our unit of analysis is the relationship-month (rather than the person-
month).7  
Equation 1 specifies the following proportional hazards model:	ℎ! ! = ℎ! !  exp !!!! 	 	 	 	 																									(Eq. 1)	
                                                
6 The financial hardship question was asked in the follow waves: wave 8 for the 1996 panel; 
wave 8 for the 2001 panel; wave 5 for the 2004 panel; and waves 6 and 9 for the 2008 panel.   
7	Because we are concerned about left censoring in our data, we perform two robustness checks.  In one, we restrict 
the sample to respondents who were asked topical module questions on marriage history. This allows us to measure 
time since the start of the marriage (rather than since the start of the survey). These questions were asked only 
regarding marriages, however, not cohabiting relationships. This restriction reduces the sample by 15 percent as it 
excludes cohabiting relationships.  The second robustness check restricts the sample to couples that begin their 
relationship during the survey period, that is, couples for which we observe the beginning of the relationship. 	
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where ℎ! t  represents the baseline hazard rate at time t and !! represents the vector of 
independent variables. Because we conduct a monthly survival analysis, but our key asset and 
debt independent variables are measured only every twelve months in the topical modules, we 
forward-fill the asset and debt values between topical modules. For example, if a couple 
responds to the topical module in wave 3, and again in wave 9, we fill in the wave 3 values for 
waves 4 through 8. This assumes that asset and debt values do not change between waves, but it 
is better than the alternative of linear interpolation, which is problematic if couples end their 
unions between waves of the topical modules.   	
 We conduct three main sets of survival analyses. The first set of analyses estimates the 
effects of total net worth, as well as detailed measures of secured and unsecured debt and liquid 
and illiquid assets on relationship stability. We then add interaction terms to this model to test 
whether the associations between wealth and union dissolution differ for married and cohabiting 
couples. We also text whether they differ for older or younger cohorts. Finally, we examine 
whether there is non-linearity in the effects of wealth and debt on relationship stability by 
entering in separate dummy variables for quartiles of the wealth and debt distributions.  
In a second set of survival analyses, we explore the symbolic and material meanings of 
wealth for relationship stability. Following Schenider (2011), we proxy the symbolic value of 
wealth, meaning that assets serve as a signal to others that a couple has reached the marriage bar 
and, thus, for whom marriage is appropriate, by testing whether simply holding any assets or 
debts affects relationship stability. We do this by including dummy variables for whether a 
couple holds each type of asset or debt. We then test whether joint ownership of the home is 
associated with relationship stability, relative to just the male partner owning the home, just the 
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female partner owning the home, or no homeownership. Second, we examine the material role of 
wealth by considering 1) whether having assets reduces the effect of an income shock on 
relationship stability, and 2) whether self-reported financial hardships explain the associations 
between debt and relationship stability.   
In a final set of survival analyses, we examine whether wealth contributes to population-
level inequalities in relationship stability by race/ethnicity or macroeconomic condition. 
Specifically, we measure the baseline differences in relationship stability by race/ethnicity and 
then add in a standard set of economic controls typically used by family researchers, which 
includes household income, education, and employment. We then test whether adding our asset 
and debt measures to the model explains any more of the racial-ethnic differences in relationship 
stability, net of the standard set of economic controls. 
Finally, we add our macroeconomic variables of state-level unemployment and national 
recession to the models. We test whether the associations between wealth and relationship 
stability vary by macroeconomic context, and whether these effects vary for married and 
cohabiting couples.   
	
RESULTS 
 The median couple in our sample has a net worth of $115,000, but this varies considerably 
between married and cohabiting couples and by race/ethnicity. The median married couple had 
about $68,000 in secured debt, $1,800 in unsecured debt, and $23,000 in liquid assets and 
$189,000 in illiquid assets. The median cohabiting couple, by contrast, had no secured debt, 
$700 in unsecured debt, $1,500 in liquid assets, and $24,000 in illiquid assets. These 
socioeconomic differences are also reflected in the divergent monthly household incomes and 
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educational distributions for the two groups. Consistent with prior research, we also observe 
stark wealth inequalities between white and black couples, with Latino and other race couples 
falling in between (see table A2). 
Assets, Debts, and Relationship Stability  
 Table 2 presents results from a Cox proportional hazards model of union dissolution. 
Model 1 includes family-level net worth (total assets minus total debts) and our full set of 
controls. A standard deviation increase in the value of a couple’s net worth decreases the risk of 
union dissolution by 31 percent (exp(–0.377)—1), controlling for other factors such as income, 
education, race, and employment. Model 2, which also adjusts for controls, tests whether 
components of net worth are differentially associated with relationship stability. We find that 
although a standard deviation increase in secured debt decreases the risk of dissolution by 12 
percent, unsecured debt is not significantly associated the hazard rate. This is contrary to our 
predictions that secured debt would not impact short-term relationship stability and that 
unsecured debt would increase the hazard of dissolution. Liquid and illiquid assets are both 
associated with relationship stability as predicted, decreasing the risk of dissolution by 49 
percent and 17 percent, respectively.8  
  
                                                
8 Because we were concerned about left censoring in our models, we re-estimated models 1 and 2 above on two sub-
samples to ensure that our results were not driven by the left censoring in our full sample. Appendix table C shows 
results that count time since the start of marriage for the subsample of respondents who completed the marital 
history topical module. The table also shows results for the subsample of respondents, married or cohabiting, who 
entered a relationship during the survey period, for whom we observe the beginning of the relationship during a 
SIPP panel. The results for these subsamples do not differ substantively from the full sample results. 
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Table 2. Cox Proportional Hazards Model Estimating Associations of Wealth and Debt with Risk of 
Romantic Relationship Dissolution  
 Model 1 Model 2 
Net Worth (sd) -0.377***  
 (0.0499)  
Detailed Asset and Debt Amounts (sd)   
     Secured Debt  -0.129*** 
  (0.0266) 
     Unsecured Debt  0.00728 
  (0.00502) 
     Liquid Assets  -0.668*** 
  (0.178) 
     Illiquid Assets  -0.192*** 
  (0.0358) 
Income (sd) -0.0888*** 0.0121 
 (0.0219) (0.0212) 
Male Partner Employed (0=unemployed) -0.550*** -0.527*** 
 (0.0346) (0.0344) 
Female Partner Employed (0=unemployed) 0.0361 0.0292 
 (0.0293) (0.0292) 
Race-Ethnicity (0=white)   
     Non-Hispanic Other Race 0.321*** 0.258*** 
 (0.0421) (0.0424) 
     Hispanic -0.131** -0.154*** 
 (0.0467) (0.0466) 
     Other 0.129* 0.108 
 (0.0574) (0.0576) 
Education (0 = Less than high school)   
     High School Degree or GED -0.105* -0.0764 
 (0.0459) (0.0458) 
     Some College -0.151** -0.0914* 
 (0.0461) (0.0463) 
     4-Year Degree or More -0.578*** -0.452*** 
 (0.0541) (0.0458) 
Age -0.0455*** -0.0424*** 
 (0.00142) (0.00149) 
Children in Household (0=no children) -0.441*** -0.339*** 
 (0.0296) (0.0299) 
Cohabiting Relationship (0=married) 0.882*** 0.850*** 
 (0.0762) (0.0758) 
   
Observations 1,738,432 1,738,432 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; sd= standard deviation. Source: 
Authors’ estimates using SIPP data. 
 
In supplemental analyses, we examined whether there were non-linear effects of assets 
and debts on relationship stability. To test for non-linearity, we included asset and debt measures 
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as quartile dummy variables instead of continuous measures. The lowest quartile of each asset 
and debt measure is the reference category. We find evidence of relatively linear effects of asset 
holdings and secured debts on relationship stability, with the magnitude of the association 
increasingly monotonically as we move up the quartiles of the distribution (table A4). We do, 
however find an interesting nonlinear effect for unsecured debt, with only large amounts of 
unsecured debt having a significant negative effect on relationship stability.  Those in the fourth 
quartile of unsecured debt, (i.e. those holding the most unsecured debt) have an 8 percent higher 
risk of dissolution compared to those in the first (lowest) quartile of unsecured debt.9  
Variation by relationship type and age cohort. Table 3 shows results from a set of models 
in which we explore how associations between wealth and relationship stability vary by 
relationship type and age cohort. First, we interacted the relationship-type dummy variable with 
each asset and debt measure (see table 3, relationship type).  Models 1, 2, and 3 show that the 
associations of unsecured debt, secured debt, and liquid assets with the risk of relationship 
dissolution do not differ significantly for married versus cohabiting couples. Model 4, however, 
shows that illiquid assets significantly increase the risk of dissolution for cohabitating couples. 
We caution that this may be due to small numbers of cohabitating couples with illiquid assets.  
 
 
  
                                                
9	We also separated out the value of a couple’s mortgage and home value from these values, since home equity 
makes up the largest share of most Americans’ investment portfolios and their mortgages the greatest contribution to 
their levels of debt (Wolff, this issue; Killewald and Bryan, this issue). We found that the asset/debt associations 
described above are not simply a “house effect;” these results hold for assets and secured debts other than homes as 
well. We also test whether being “underwater” on one’s mortgage affects relationship stability, possibly by 
increasing the costs of dissolution. However, we do not find significant effects.  
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Table 3. Cox Proportional Hazards Models Estimating Associations of Wealth and Debt with Risk of 
Romantic Relationship Dissolution by Relationship Type and Age Cohort 
 Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Panel A. Relationship Type     
     Secured Debt –0.133*** –0.129*** –0.129*** –0.129*** 
 (0.0267) (0.0266) (0.0266) (0.0266) 
     Unsecured Debt 0.00734 0.00696 0.00729 0.00727 
 (0.00500) (0.00521) (0.00502) (0.00504) 
     Liquid Assets –0.666*** –0.668*** –0.665*** –0.662*** 
 (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) 
     Illiquid Assets –0.193*** –0.192*** –0.192*** –0.199*** 
 (0.0358) (0.0358) (0.0358) (0.0364) 
     Cohabiting Relationship (0=married) 0.945*** 0.850*** 0.808*** 0.971*** 
 (0.0892) (0.0769) (0.135) (0.0904) 
Interactions     
     Cohabit * Secured 0.233    
 (0.119)    
     Cohabit * Unsecured  0.128   
  (0.171)   
     Cohabit * Liquid   -0.544  
   (1.362)  
     Cohabit * Illiquid    0.284** 
    (0.100) 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Panel B. Age Cohorts     
     Secured Debt -0.221*** -0.129*** -0.138*** -0.128*** 
 (0.0358) (0.0265) (0.0263) (0.0280) 
     Unsecured Debt 0.00672 0.00807 0.00727 0.00720 
 (0.00501) (0.0291) (0.00498) (0.00494) 
     Liquid Assets -0.695*** -0.670*** 0.121 -0.671*** 
 (0.180) (0.179) (0.283) (0.190) 
     Illiquid Assets -0.195*** -0.192*** -0.185*** -0.198** 
 (0.0354) (0.0358) (0.0350) (0.0591) 
     40-64 Yrs. Cohort (ref=18-39 yrs.) 0.221*** 0.231*** 0.181** 0.232*** 
 (0.0497) (0.0494) (0.0507) (0.0501) 
Interactions     
     40-64 Yrs. Cohort * Secured 0.169***    
 (0.0420)    
     40-64 Yrs. Cohort * Unsecured  -0.000967   
  (0.0294)   
     40-64 Yrs. Cohort * Liquid   -1.065***  
   (0.305)  
     40-64 Yrs. Cohort * Illiquid    -0.00718 
    (0.0599) 
N = 1,813,055. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Note: Controls 
(income, employment, race, education, age, children, relationship type) in model, coefficients not shown. 
Asset and debt amounts in standard deviation units. Source: Authors’ estimates using SIPP data. 
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We therefore cannot reject the null hypothesis that assets and debts function similarly for married 
and cohabiting couples. 
Table 3 shows whether the associations between wealth and relationship stability differ 
for older and younger age cohorts. Our results here are largely consistent with predictions from a 
life cycle model of savings and debt. A one standard deviation increase in the amount of secured 
debt decreases the risk of dissolution by 20 percent for younger cohorts, but only by 7 percent for 
older cohorts. Thus, secured debt is less protective of relationship stability for older couples than 
for younger couples. Unsecured debt has little association with stability for any age group.  
Model 7 shows that liquid assets have an increased effect among older couples. That is, a 
standard deviation increase in liquid assets among older couples decreases the risk of dissolution 
by 61 percent (exp(–0.121–1.065)); for younger couples, liquid assets are not significantly 
associated with relationship stability. The association between illiquid assets and relationship 
stability does not differ for older and younger cohorts.  
Symbolic and Material Meanings of Wealth  
Scholars have argued that wealth matters for relationships because of what it symbolizes, 
apart from its economic value (Schneider 2011; Zeilzer 1997; Cherlin 2004). Ownership of 
assets, such as home or a car, independent of their value, can serve as symbolic markers of 
success and status, and researchers have found that these asset holdings matter for entry into 
marriage (Schenider 2011; Edin and Kefalas 2005). We build on this line of research by testing 
whether holding any asset or debt (in contrast to assessing the effect of amounts) is associated 
with relationship stability.  The results indicate that simply having some amount of assets and 
debts is significantly associated with the risk of dissolution compared to not holding any amount 
of assets and debts, controlling for other factors (see table A5).  
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The sole versus joint ownership of assets may also be symbolically significant, in that 
couples who hold their assets—homes, cars, bank accounts—jointly report greater commitment 
to their relationships and higher levels of relationship satisfaction, which may be the result of 
greater trust and support. The results indicate that sole homeownership, whether the owner is the 
woman or the man in the relationship, increases the risk of dissolution by about 60 percent over 
not owning (see table A5).10 In contrast to the effect of sole ownership, jointly owning the home 
decreases the hazard rate by 49 percent over not owning. We therefore find strong support for the 
symbolic value of asset and debt holdings. 
 Wealth also has potentially important material value for couples as well. They can 
liquidate asset holdings or draw on interest to provide extra income, and they can serve as a 
buffer against unexpected financial insecurities.  In order to examine the material meaning of 
wealth for relationship stability, we ask whether the effect of income shocks on relationship 
stability was weaker for couples with greater asset holdings to draw upon. We tested this by 
including an indicator for whether the couple experienced an income shock in the prior month, 
measured as a negative income change from the month before, and interacting this measure with 
liquid and illiquid assets (see table A6).A negative income shock increases the risk of dissolution 
while liquid assets reduce this negative effect, although the coefficient does not reach 
conventional levels of statistical significance. Illiquid assets do not alter the effect of an income 
shock in any substantively or statically significant way.  
We also examine the possibility that debts are either markers of financial hardship or 
directly create financial hardship via the cost associated with debt repayment and other fees (see 
table A6). Consistent with prior research, we find that experiences of financial hardship increase 
                                                
10 About 2 percent of our sample lives in a household in which the female partner is the sole owner of the house. 
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the risk of relationship dissolution significantly. We also find that the financial hardship measure 
explains 29 percent of the association between large amounts of unsecured debt and relationship 
stability.11   
Wealth and Racial Inequality in Relationships 
Researchers have found that socioeconomic differences, measured by income, education, 
and employment, explain part of the relationship stability gap, but much remains unexplained. 
We examine whether assets and debts explain part of the black-white gap in relationship 
stability. Model 1 in table 4 includes only race-ethnicity dummy variables and controls for age, 
children, and relationship type. This first model shows that black couples are 53 percent more 
likely to end their relationships than white couples. Model 2 adds in the economic measures that 
previous research has found decrease this gap: income, employment, and education. Indeed, in 
this model, the likelihood of dissolution for black couples falls to 41 percent more than for 
whites, leaving a significant portion of the gap unexplained. Model 3 adds our measures for 
assets and debts. As these results show, the likelihood of dissolution for black couples is now 29 
percent higher than for whites. This suggests that assets and debts reduce the black-white 
relationship stability gap by about 45 percent, which is about as much as the standard set of 
economic controls explained. In other words, assets and debts explain a substantial portion of the 
black-white gap in relationship stability, rivaling that of other standard socioeconomic measures.  
We find no significant differences between the relationship stability of white and Latino 
couples when adjusting only for age, children, and relationship type. However, in model 2, 
where income, employment, and education are adjusted, Latino couples actually face an 11 
                                                
11 The models in panel B of appendix table F are estimated on a subset of observations because respondents’ 
answers to the financial hardship question applied to only twelve months of the three to four year survey period, thus 
many observations could not be used for this analysis.  
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percent lower risk of dissolution than white couples. This reduction in the hazard rate increases 
to 16 percent in model 3 when adding in assets and debts.  
 
Table 4. Cox Proportional Hazards Models Examining Racial-Ethnic Differences in Relationship Stability  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Race-Ethnicity (0=white)    
     Non-Hispanic Black 0.424*** 0.341*** 0.255*** 
 (0.0420) (0.0420) (0.0422) 
     Hispanic 0.0507 -0.119* -0.168** 
 (0.0435) (0.0465) (0.0464) 
     Other 0.0961* 0.138* 0.0970* 
 (0.0575) (0.0574) (0.0576) 
Secured Debt   -0.135*** 
   (0.0263) 
Unsecured Debt   0.0141* 
   (0.00501) 
Liquid Assets   -0.301*** 
   (0.0518) 
Illiquid Assets   –0.219*** 
   (0.0370) 
Income (sd)  –0.129*** –0.00122 
  (0.0216) (0.0202) 
Male Partner Employed (0=unemployed) –0.686*** –0.545*** –0.510*** 
 (0.0325) (0.0346) (0.0344) 
Female Partner Employed (0=unemployed) –0.116*** –0.0233 –0.0208 
 (0.0284) (0.0293) (0.0292) 
Education (0=Less than HS)     
     High School Degree or GED  –0.117** –0.0835* 
  (0.0460) (0.0458) 
     Some College  –0.171*** –0.107** 
  (0.0461) (0.0461) 
     4-Year Degree or More  –0.619*** –0.466*** 
  (0.0538) (0.0539) 
Age –0.0501*** -0.0483*** –0.0424*** 
 (0.00134) (0.00136) (0.00145) 
Children in Household (0=no children) –0.427*** –0.441*** –0.394*** 
 (0.0293) (0.0296) (0.0299) 
Cohabiting Relationship (0=married) 0.950*** 0.888*** 0.833*** 
 (0.0764) (0.0765) (0.0761) 
Observations 1,738,432 1,738,432 1,738,432 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Asset and income variables 
measured in standard deviation units. Source: Authors’ estimates using SIPP data. 
 
Macroeconomic Conditions and Relationship Stability The theoretical predictions for 
how macroeconomic conditions shape divorce are mixed, with some theories suggesting that 
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adverse conditions would reduce marital stability while others suggest that adverse conditions 
would actually promote marital stability by making it more costly to divorce. The theoretical 
predictions for cohabitation are clearer, however, suggesting that cohabitations would be more 
stable in times of macroeconomic hardship.  
In this final set of results, we consider the effects of macro-economic conditions on 
relationship stability and examine whether the effects of macroeconomic conditions differ for 
marriages and cohabitations. Models 1 and 2 in table 5 show that macroeconomic conditions do 
not attenuate the relationship between assets, debts, and relationship stability as we expected 
they might.  
Model 2 of table 5 shows that couples living in states where unemployment levels are in 
the second are not at significantly more risk of dissolving their unions than those in states at just 
the first quartile (lowest unemployment). However, those in states in the third and fourth (highest 
unemployment) quartile face a 7 and 26 percent higher risk of union dissolution relative to those 
with the lowest unemployment. National-level recession increases the risk of dissolution by 54 
percent. Model 2 adds the wealth and debt measures to the models. These measures do not 
appear to mediate the association between state-level unemployment and relationship 
dissolution. 
Model 3 interacts the cohabitation dummy variable with the fourth quartile of 
unemployment dummy variable. The results indicate that there are important differences in 
macroeconomic effects for married versus cohabiting couples – married couples face an 
increased hazard rate in poor macroeconomic conditions while cohabiting couples actually face a 
decreased risk. That is, comparing two cohabiting couples, the couple living in a state with the 
highest quartile of unemployment rather than a state in the lowest quartile of unemployment is 
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16 percent less likely to break up (exp(0.247–0.417)).This provides support for the hypothesis 
that cohabiting relationships are more stable during tough macroeconomic times, while 
marriages are less stable. 
 
Table 5. Cox Proportional Hazards Models Examine Associations of Macro-Economic Conditions with 
Risk of Romantic Relationship Dissolution 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Secured Debt –0.129*** –0.133*** –0.133*** 
 (0.0266) (0.0262) (0.0262) 
Unsecured Debt 0.00728 0.00696 0.00703 
 (0.00502) (0.00551) (0.00547) 
Liquid Assets –0.668*** –0.681*** –0.682*** 
 (0.178) (0.180) (0.180) 
Illiquid Assets –0.192*** –0.186*** –0.186*** 
 (0.0358) (0.0353) (0.0353) 
National Recession (0=no recession)  0.432*** 0.433*** 
  (0.114) (0.114) 
Quartiles of State Unemployment (0= 1st Q) 
 
   
     2nd Quartile  0.0607 0.0604 
  (0.0378) (0.0378) 
     3rd Quartile  0.0745* 0.0743* 
  (0.0379) (0.0379) 
     4th Quartile  0.233*** 0.247*** 
  (0.0379) (0.0382) 
Cohabiting Relationship (0=married) 0.850*** 0.835*** 0.955*** 
 (0.0758) (0.0763) (0.0857) 
Cohabit * 4th Quartile of Unemployment   -0.417* 
   (0.169) 
    
Observations 1,738,432 1,738,432 1,738,432 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
Controls: income, employment, race, education, age, children are in all models. 
Asset and income variables measured in standard deviation units. Source: Authors’ estimates using SIPP 
data. 
	
DISCUSSION	
Our analysis provides a nuanced portrait of how wealth is related to the stability of family 
relationships, exploring how this association varies across types of debt and types of unions. We 
found that both liquid and illiquid assets are associated with the stability of marital relationships. 
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Consistent with Schneider (2011), we found evidence that these associations reflected both the 
material as well as the symbolic values of wealth for relationships. We found suggestive 
evidence that liquid assets buffered against the adverse consequences of transitory shocks to 
income.  The protective effect of liquid assets was particularly pronounced for older age cohorts, 
consistent with a life cycle theory of savings. We also found that simply holding any kind of 
asset is associated with relationship stability, consistent with an interpretation that assets hold 
symbolic meaning, independent of their actual amount. The joint ownership of assets also 
appears to have symbolic value for relationships, as we found that joint ownership of a home is 
associated with relationship stability relative to renting, while sole ownership by either the male 
or female partner was less stable than not owning a house at all.     
 We found more mixed associations between debt and relationship stability. Large 
amounts of unsecured debt are associated with a reduction in marital stability, which we found 
was due in part to the fact that these couples reported greater financial hardship. Unsecured debt 
may therefore either create financial hardship directly or be a marker for it.  Secured debts are 
associated with an increase in marital stability, however. Secured debts, like mortgages, are 
investments made to boost long-term wellbeing, which may explain why they are associated with 
an increase rather than a decrease in stability. This may also explain why secured debt was a 
stronger predictor of relationship stability for younger couples than it was for older couples. 
Another possibility for the differences in the strength of the association between secured debt 
and dissolution for older and younger couples maybe that investment or willingness to take on 
secured debt provides a stronger signal of maturity within younger couples, as older couples may 
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have other signals to rely on (Brüderl and Kalter 2001).12 However, if unsecured debt worked 
solely as a signaling mechanism, one would expect illiquid assets to exhibit similar differences 
between older and younger cohorts, which we did not find.  
 Although theory suggests that wealth and debt shape union stability differently for 
married and unmarried couples, we found little evidence for this in our analysis. If marriage is 
protective due to its legal and institutionalized commitment mechanisms, one might predict that 
married couples would be more likely to stay together in the face of adverse wealth conditions. 
If, however, couples hold marriage in high esteem, as the ‘marriage bar’ theory suggests, married 
couples might be more likely to break up in the face of asset or debt adversity than cohabiting 
couples. Contrary to both of these theories, we found that there were no significant differences 
between married and cohabiting couples in terms of how wealth and debt shaped the stability of 
their romantic unions. There are several possible reasons for this null finding. First, it could be 
that both of the theories above are at work and they cancel each other out. Second, there are a 
relatively small number of cohabiting unions in our analysis and large standard errors around our 
interaction terms, which means that we cannot rule out potentially meaningful differences among 
these two types of unions. 	
 Consistent with prior research, we found substantial racial differences in relationship 
stability: black couples were 53 percent more likely to end their relationships than whites. The 
conventional socioeconomic measures of income, employment, and education explained a 
portion of this black-white gap in relationship stability. When we included them in the models, 
the increased risk of dissolution for blacks relative to whites dropped by 23 percent, to 41 
                                                
12 We thank a reviewer for pointing this out.  
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percent. When we added measures of wealth and debt to the models, they explained a significant 
additional portion of the black-white gap: the greater relative likelihood of dissolution for blacks 
drops to 29 percent, which is a further reduction of about 29 percent. Prior research by Schneider 
(2011) found that wealth measures explained about 30 percent of the black-white marriage gap in 
marriage entry; here we find that wealth also explains a significant portion of the black-white 
gap in the stability of relationships after they form. It may be that this reduction in the racial gap 
in relationship stability is due to wealth having a similar use value within couples of any 
race/ethnicity – that is, wealth acting to buffer hardships or smooth consumption. However, the 
ability of wealth to further close the gap may be limited if wealth does not serve the same 
symbolic value within relationships of all race/ethnicities. Wealth may be unable to have similar 
symbolic value because different racial/ethnic groups do not have the same access or inclination 
to accumulate particular assets (Brimmer 1988). For example, black Americans have more 
difficulty getting a mortgage or getting the same type of mortgage as white Americans (Rugh 
and Massey 2010). Examining the effect of different types of assets on the racial gap is an 
important area for future research. Additional research is indeed important, as our results suggest 
that the black-white wealth divide may have lasting consequences for the intergenerational 
reproduction of inequality via its effects on family instability, independent of other measures of 
socioeconomic status. 	
 Finally, we examined the role of macroeconomic conditions on the stability of family 
relationships. We found that high levels of state unemployment (in the top quartile) were 
associated with an increased risk of dissolution, relative to periods of low state unemployment. 
We also examined whether these associations differed for cohabiting unions, predicting that 
cohabiting unions may be more stable during hard times as this allows for pooling limited 
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resources. We found support for this in that cohabiters’ risk of dissolution was significantly 
lower in states with high unemployment compared to those in states with low unemployment. 	
Our analysis has several limitations that readers should keep in mind when interpreting 
our findings. First, our use of the SIPP data precludes our ability to look at longer-term 
trajectories of marital instability and wealth accumulation over the entire life course, as each 
SIPP panel lasts only three to four years. Second, our analysis has focused on wealth as a key 
predictor of relationship stability, but relationship instability is also an important potential cause 
of declining assets or growing indebtedness; indeed divorce is one of the key antecedents of 
bankruptcy (Sullivan et al. 2001). Isolating the causal effect of relationship instability on changes 
in wealth is tricky, as there are a host of unobserved factors that could cause both relationship 
instability and financial hardship (Fisher and Lyons 2006). This is clearly an important question 
for future research to disentangle (see Killewald and Bryan, this issue), as it can help to provide 
more precise estimates of the role of family instability in producing wealth inequality.  
Taken together, our results highlight the important yet understudied role of wealth on the 
stability of family relationships.  Much of the prior research on wealth inequality and family 
processes has focused on how wealth explains gaps in marriage entry; here, we find that wealth 
plays an important role in shaping marital stability as well. We find that debt and assets are 
significantly associated with the stability of both marital and cohabiting relationships. The 
importance of debt and assets remains net of the standard set of socioeconomic controls of 
education, employment, and income, and the magnitude of wealth effects is often comparable to 
the magnitude of these standard socioeconomic measures. Furthermore, assets and debts appear 
to have not only material value for relationships, buffering against income shocks and either 
creating or ameliorating financial hardships, but also symbolic value. The ownership of assets in 
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and of themselves can serve as a marker of status, and the joint ownership of assets can signal 
relationship commitment. Because family instability has adverse consequences for children 
(McLanahan, Tach, and Schneider 2013), our results suggest that family instability may be one 
important mechanism through which the intergenerational transmission of wealth inequality 
operates. As a result, policy interventions that reduce wealth inequality may also serve to reduce 
inequalities in children’s exposure to family instability. 	
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Appendix A. Content and variable names of SIPP assets and debt survey questions used in 
wealth / debt measures.  
   
Measures SIPP Variable Contents SIPP Variable Name 
Unsecured 
Debt 
Credit card or store debt with partner ealjdab or taljdab 
 Credit card or store debt owed by 
reference person 
ealidab or talidab 
   
 Loans owed with partner ealjdal or taljdal 
 Loans owed by reference person ealidal or talidal 
 Other debt owed with partner ealjdao or taljdao 
 Other owed by reference person ealidao or talidao 
Secured 
Debt 
Debt on jointly held stocks or mutual 
funds 
esmjmav or tsmjmav 
   
 Debt on reference person’s stocks or 
mutual funds 
esmimav or tsmimav 
   
 Debt on mobile home or lot tmhpr 
 Principle owed on mortgage tmor1pr 
(Could be more than one owner. 
Value applied proportionally) 
   
 Principle owed on rental properties owned 
with partner 
trjpri 
(Half value applied to both partners) 
   
 Principle reference person owes on rental 
properties 
tripri 
   
 Auto loans tcarval1, tcarval2, tcarval3 
(Value applied proportionally to 
owners) 
   
 Business debt tvbde1, tvbde2 
(Value applied proportionally to 
owners) 
Liquid 
Assets 
Equity in investments eoaeq (not asked in 2004 or 2008) 
 Amount in joint interest earning account tiajta 
 Amount in reference person interest 
earning account 
tiaita 
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 Amount in joint checking account taljcha 
 Amount in reference person checking 
account 
talicha 
   
 Amount in joint bonds/US securities timja 
 Amount in reference person bonds/US 
securities 
timia 
   
 Value of joint stocks or mutual funds esmjv or tsmjv 
 Value of reference person stocks or mutual 
funds 
esmiv or tsmiv 
   
 Face Value of U.S. Savings Bonds talsbv 
 Market value of IRA account(s) talrb 
 Market value of KEOGH account(s) talkb 
 Market value of 401K taltb 
Illiquid 
Assets 
Value of house tpropval 
(Applied proportionally) 
   
 Value of mobile home tmhval 
 Value of other real estate tothreva 
(Applied proportionally) 
   
 Value of car(s) carval1, carval2, carval3 
(Applied proportionally) 
   
 Value of rental property jointly held not 
with partner 
trtsha 
   
 Value of rental property jointly held with 
partner 
trjmv 
   
 Value of rental property held by reference 
person 
trimv 
   
 Amount owed for sale business/property ealowa or talowa 
 Principle owed on mortgage tmip 
 Principle owed on mortgage jointly held tmjp 
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 Business equity tvbva1,  tvbva2 
Note: some variable names change between panels. 
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Appendix Table B. Economic Characteristics by Race/Ethnicity in the 1996 – 2008 Panels of the 
SIPP 
 Non-Hispanic 
White 
Non-Hispanic 
Black 
Hispanic/ 
Latino 
Non-Hispanic 
Other Race 
Secured Debt     
     Percent has  73 57 50 62 
     Mean (if have) $149,000 $125,000 $143,000 $189,000 
     Median (if have) $118,000 $95,000 $111,000 $155,000 
     
Unsecured Debt     
     Percent has 66 63 53 56 
     Mean (if have) $19,000 $17,000 $14,000 $19,000 
     Median (if have) $7,000 $7,000 $5,000 $7,000 
     
Liquid Assets     
     Percent has 91 75 65 86 
     Mean (if have) $152,000 $52,000 $38,000 $107,000 
     Median (if have) $44,000 $11,000 $5,000 $27,000 
     
Illiquid Assets     
     Percent has 99 92 91 95 
     Mean (if have) $300,000 $172,000 $173,000 $307,000 
     Median (if have) $205,000 $111,000 $94,000 $203,000 
     
N 1,325,775 129,946 183,205 99,506 
Note: statistics weighted using national sampling weights. Values reported in 2013 dollars.  Race 
is the race of the household reference person. Source: Authors’ estimates using SIPP data. 
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Appendix Table C. Robustness Analyses: Cox Proportional Hazards Models on Samples Without 
Left Censoring 
 Marital History Subsample New Relationship Subsample 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Net Worth (sd) –0.299***  –0.243  
 (0.0446)  (0.144)  
Secured Debt  -0.0841**  –0.0765 
  (0.0272)  (0.0584) 
Unsecured Debt  0.00542  –0.112 
  (0.00575)  (0.0801) 
Liquid Assets  -0.349*  –0.496 
  (0.172)  (0.277) 
Illiquid Assets  -0.110**  0.0206 
  (0.0332)  (0.0635) 
Income (sd) –0.0256 0.0108 –0.140** –0.116* 
 (0.0219) (0.0222) (0.0491) (0.0548) 
Male Employed (0=unemployed) –0.603*** -0.590*** –0.228** –0.221** 
 (0.0412) (0.0412) (0.0742) (0.0758) 
Female Employed (0=unemployed) –0.0583 -0.0499 –0.128* –0.123 
 (0.0348) (0.0347) (0.0644) (0.0655) 
Race-Ethnicity (0= Non-Hispanic 
White) 
    
     Non-Hispanic Other Race 0.206*** 0.179*** 0.181* 0.168 
 (0.0518) (0.0522) (0.0885) (0.0870) 
     Hispanic –0.0894* –0.0999 -0.170 –0.181 
 (0.0540) (0.0540) (0.0970) (0.0978) 
     Other 0.0839 0.0760 0.0951 0.0854 
 (0.0676) (0.0678) (0.118) (0.118) 
Education (0= Less than HS)     
     High School Degree or GED –0.128* –0.112* –0.154 –0.146 
 (0.0547) (0.0547) (0.0961) (0.0967) 
     Some College –0.223*** –0.189*** –0.267** –0.245* 
 (0.0548) (0.0551) (0.0950) (0.0965) 
     4-Year Degree or More –0.696*** –0.627*** –0.551*** –0.495*** 
 (0.0636) (0.0649) (0.113) (0.119) 
Age –0.0124*** –0.0115*** –0.00633* –0.00614* 
 (0.00207) (0.00210) (0.00285) (0.00295) 
Children (0=no children) –0.0921* –0.0777* –0.0409 –0.0408 
 (0.0378) (0.0379) (0.0624) (0.0622) 
Cohabiting (0=married)   0.249* 0.246* 
   (0.107) (0.107) 
Observations 1,547,889 1,547,889 85,758 85,758 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Asset and income variables 
measured in standard deviation units. Source: Authors’ estimates using SIPP data. 
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Appendix Table D. Cox Proportional Hazards Model Predicting Non-Linear Associations of Wealth 
and Debt on Risk of Union Dissolution. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Secured Debt   
   
     4th Quartile –0.135*** –0.136*** 
 (0.0377) (0.0377) 
     Mortgage (sd) –0.0331 –0.0196 
 (0.0243) (0.0262) 
Unsecured Debt (ref=1st quartile)   
     2nd Quartile 0.00619 0.00580 
 (0.0542) (0.0542) 
     3rd Quartile 0.0252 0.0248 
 (0.0344) (0.0344) 
     4th Quartile 0.0736* 0.0735* 
 (0.0341) (0.0341) 
Liquid Assets (ref= 1st quartile)   
     2nd Quartile –0.139*** –0.139*** 
 (0.0358) (0.0359) 
     3rd Quartile –0.371*** –0.372*** 
 (0.0425) (0.0425) 
     4th Quartile –0.484*** –0.484*** 
 (0.0529) (0.0529) 
Illiquid Assets (ref= 1st quartile)   
     2nd Quartile –0.265*** –0.265*** 
 (0.0376) (0.0376) 
     3rd Quartile –0.327*** –0.326*** 
 (0.0396) (0.0396) 
     4th Quartile –0.340*** –0.339*** 
 (0.0467) (0.0467) 
     Home Equity (sd) –0.238*** –0.248*** 
 (0.0306) (0.0319) 
Mortgage Circumstance   
     Underwater  –0.0949 
  (0.0676) 
   
Observations 1,738,432 1,738,432 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; sd = standard deviation 
units. Controls for income, employment, education, age, children, and relationship type included in 
all models.  
Respondents’ holdings of secured debts, less the value of the mortgage, did not fall into the 2nd or 3rd 
quartiles, thus they are omitted. This reflects the fact that, expect for mortgage debt, most people do 
not have much other secured debt, expect for those who own businesses, who then tend hold large 
amounts of other secured debt.  
Measured as a dummy variable indicating whether respondent owes more on mortgage than the 
current value of the house.  
Source: Authors’ estimates using SIPP data. 
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Appendix Table E. Cox Proportional Hazards Model Examining Associations of Joint and Sole 
Wealth and Debt Ownership with Risk of Romantic Relationship Dissolution 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Has Secured Debt (0=does not have) –0.390*** -0.140*** –0.140*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0342) (0.0342) 
Has Unsecured Debt (0=does not have) 0.0853** 0.0803** 0.0801** 
 (0.0289) (0.0289) (0.0289) 
Has Liquid Assets (0=does not have) –0.261*** -0.210*** –0.210*** 
 (0.0365) (0.0360) (0.0360) 
Has Illiquid Assets (0=does not have) –0.377*** –0.328*** –0.328*** 
 (0.0514) (0.0511) (0.0511) 
Joint vs. Sole Homeownership (0 = do not own)    
     One Partner Owns Home  0.468***  
  (0.0484)  
     Partners Jointly Own Home  –0.674*** –0.674*** 
  (0.0384) (0.0384) 
     Male Partner Solely Owns Home   0.425*** 
   (0.0630) 
     Female Partner Solely Owns Home   0.509*** 
   (0.0611) 
    
Observations 1,738,432 1,738,432 1,738,432 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Controls for income, 
employment, race, education, age, children, and relationship type Included in all models. Source: 
Authors’ estimates using SIPP data. 
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Appendix Table E. Cox Proportional Hazards Models Examining Associations of Financial 
Insecurity with Risk of Romantic Relationship Dissolution, by Amount of Wealth and Debt  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Panel A. Financial Insecurity    
     Secured Debt –0.129*** –0.129*** –0.128*** 
 (0.0266) (0.0266) (0.0266) 
     Unsecured Debt 0.00718 0.00714 0.00715 
 (0.00503) (0.00504) (0.00504) 
     Liquid Assets –0.672*** –0.857** –0.671*** 
 (0.178) (0.168) (0.178) 
     Illiquid Assets –0.193*** –0.193*** –0.210*** 
 (0.0358) (0.0356) (0.0404) 
     Income (sd) –0.00770 –0.00622 –0.00711 
 (0.0211) (0.0208) (0.0210) 
     Income Shock (0 = no shock) 0.138*** 0.163*** 0.149*** 
 (0.0301) (0.0324) (0.0315) 
     Interactions    
          Income Shock * Liquid Assets  0.583  
  (0.317)  
          Income Shock * Illiquid Assets   0.0586 
   (0.0539) 
     Observations 1,738,432 1,738,432 1,738,432 
 Model 4 Model 5  
Panel B. Financial Hardship    
     Secured Debt     
          4th Quartile (ref=1st quartile) –0.0366 –0.0464  
 (0.0757) (0.0753)  
          Mortgage (sd) –0.103 –0.114*  
 (0.0584) (0.0578)  
     Unsecured Debt (ref=1st quartile)    
          2nd Quartile –0.00282 –0.0158  
 (0.118) (0.117)  
          3rd Quartile 0.115 0.0722  
 (0.0724) (0.0726)  
          4th Quartile 0.189** 0.135  
 (0.0729) (0.0732)  
     Financial Hardship (0=no hardship)  0.679***  
  (0.0670)  
     Observations 446,379 446,379  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Controls: employment, 
race, education, age, children, relationship type in all models. Models 4 and 5 have liquid and 
illiquid assets quartile variables in the models. Asset and income variables measured in standard 
deviation units. Source: Authors’ estimates using SIPP data. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
 
This dissertation examines the cultural process of constructing policymaking problems and 
considers the consequences of particular constructions of a problem for the resulting policy 
responses. I analyze the construction of the housing market collapse in the U.S. in the late 2000s, 
identifying variations in key policymakers understanding of mortgage borrowers and mortgage 
lenders, which impacted the policies they advocated during the crisis. I also analyze the 
construction of the foreclosure crisis within U.S. states, a context that allows for statistical 
analysis of the relationship between cultural meaning and policy adoption. The crisis eroded the 
wealth of U.S. households and the policy response, although aiding a quick recovery of assets 
disproportionately held by wealthier households, did little to stabilize housing assets, which is 
often the only asset held by middle and lower income households. This dissertation also 
examines the relationships between wealth, debt, family stability, and macro-economic contexts. 
 The theoretical contributions of the dissertation are twofold. First, this work contributes 
to the growing culture and policymaking literature by elaborating a framework of defining a 
policymaking problem, a process in which cultural meaning is essential. The locus of available 
cultural meanings is policymaking organizations' previous and on-going engagements. Although 
policymakers had to make sense of a newly emerging situation in the housing markets, they 
nevertheless were already engaged in various capacities with housing and mortgage borrowing 
and lending. While working to make sense of the problems in the housing markets, policymakers 
drew on the meanings embedded in those previous engagements.  
 This moves previous culture and policy work beyond invoking “deeply embedded 
cultural categories” (Steensland 2006: 1274) without identifying where they are embedded. 
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Locating cultural meaning at the organizational level, rather than conceiving of culture as 
operating at the national level (e.g. Dobbin 1994), helps account for the conflict that often 
characterizes policymaking. Additionally, this work suggests that the potential for both path 
dependency as well as change is contained in the use of foregoing organizational meanings to 
define an unfolding problem. While policymaking organizations creatively put organizational 
resources to innovative uses (rather than being strictly constrained by them), they did so to the 
extent that particular actions made sense given their understanding of the problem. If 
policymakers' understanding of the situation implies particular action, they can re-interpret the 
scope of their authority or a particular policy accordingly, leading to institutional changes. At the 
same time, since policymakers are drawing on meanings embedded in their previous 
engagements, its not likely that their definitions of an unfolding problem will suggest actions far 
afield from those previous engagements. However, when an emerging problem results in 
interaction among policymakers who may draw on different embedded meanings, the negotiated 
definitions in such situations may imply wholly new actions.  
 This work also contributes to organizational theory, which has tended to focus on three 
theoretical pillars: interests, institutions, and organizational structures (Amenta, Bonastia, Caren 
2001; Scott 2014; Skocpol 1985). In the case of the housing market collapse, it is easy to 
imagine interests--those of Wall Street-bound regulators or of Wall Street participants 
themselves--influencing the policy response. It is also easy to imagine the world-class 
economists running the highly structured economic policymaking bureaucracies following more 
or less rational policymaking procedures. However, retracing the unfolding of the crisis and 
considering the problem as policymakers did at various time points, shows what others have 
argued--interests are not always clear in uncertain situations. Similarly, the applicability of 
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foregoing institutional and organizational structures is unclear. Cultural meanings “refract” 
interests and give direction to institutional and other structural forces (Anderson 2013; Campbell 
2002; Meryl and Quinn 2017: 8; Weber [1922] 1946: 280).  
 However, identifying the relevant aspect of culture is difficult (Kane 1997; Norton 2014.) 
As the crisis unfolded, policymakers initially differed in their assessments of the severity of the 
situation and the particular conditions and events leading to it.  Policymakers who came to be in 
opposition on the appropriate housing market response, nevertheless, quickly sorted out the basic 
narrative of the subprime expansion, loose underwriting, and ubiquitous “toxic” mortgage-
backed securities destabilizing financial markets. Rather than the cultural tension being over the 
causes of the crisis, the relevant cultural meanings that implied vastly different policy responses 
to the housing collapse were more fundamental: a construction of mortgage borrowers and 
lenders. Are mortgage borrowers rational investors who will walk away from an underwater 
mortgage? Or are they struggling homeowners who would and could fulfill their financial 
obligations with some help? In one of these constructions it makes sense to commit tax dollars to 
the problem while in the other it would be irresponsible. Similarly, are mortgage lenders neutral 
providers of financial choices or are they predatory lenders of exploitative products? If the 
former, government-mandated mortgage modifications would be government overreach into 
markets and an abrogation of contracts. These cultural understandings are the foundation of 
policymakers' policy responses to the housing market collapse. Without this foundation, the 
contention between policymakers as well as their preferred policies do not make sense.  
 The analyses in this dissertation advance methodological approaches that use 
computational methods to measure and quantify cultural concepts. I use topic modeling to 
coherently display themes in large bodies of text and offer these as corroborating evidence of 
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qualitative presentations of pieces of the same data. I also use computational procedures to 
quantify cultural meaning for use in event history and diffusion models. While there is still much 
room for improvement, these methodological advances open up many new data sources and 
methods for culture researchers.  
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